sapsf/slides.org

#+startup: beamer
#+TITLE: The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom
#+AUTHOR: Mike Gerwitz
#+EMAIL: mtg@gnu.org
#+DATE: 26 March, LibrePlanet 2017
#+OPTIONS: H:3 num:nil toc:nil p:nil todo:nil stat:nil
#+LaTeX_CLASS: beamer
#+LaTeX_CLASS_OPTIONS: [presentation]
#+BEAMER_THEME: Warsaw
#+BEAMER_HEADER: \beamertemplatenavigationsymbolsempty
#+BEAMER_HEADER: \setbeamertemplate{bibliography item}{\insertbiblabel}
#+BIBLIOGRAPHY: sapsf plain
#+TODO: RAW(r) DEVOID(v) LACKING(l) DRAFT(d) REVIEWED(R) | AUGMENT(A) READY(+) REHEARSED(D)
#+COLUMNS: %40ITEM %10DURATION{:} %8TODO %BEAMER_ENV(ENVIRONMENT)


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
*Remember the themes!*:
  - Surreptitious
  - User privacy and security
  - Affects on freedom; chilling effects
  - How free software can help

The big players seem to be the [[The Web][Web]] and [[Policy and Government][Government]].
No surprises there.


It would be a good idea to immediately connect with the audience.  So:
  - Most everyone has a mobile device.
    - /This is the most immediate and relatable since it's physically present/
      with them in their travels.
  - Security cameras et. al. during travel.

So start _briefly_ with the topic of pervasive surveillance?
  - That is what the abstract refers to, after all.

*Surreptitious*---many audience members won't consider that they're being
tracked.
  - But by _whom_?

Maybe a gentle introduction that gets increasingly more alarming and
invasive topic-wise.
#+END_COMMENT


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* LACKING Slides                                              :export:ignore:
** READY Introduction / Opening                                :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Hello, everyone.
Thanks for coming!

My name's Mike Gerwitz.
I am a free software hacker and activist with a focus on user privacy and
  security.
I'm also a GNU Maintainer, software evaluator, and volunteer for various
  other duties.

And I'm here to talk to you about an unfortunate,
  increasingly unavoidable fact of life.

None of you made it here without being tracked in some capacity.
Some of us are /still/ being tracked at this very moment!

This isn't a tinfoil hat presentation.
It's a survey of facts.
/Actual/ facts, not alternative ones!  (Dig at Kellyanne Conway, for those
  reading this in the future.)
Since time isn't on my side here,
  I'm going to present a broad overview of the most pressing concerns of
  today.
Every slide has numeric citations,
  which are associated with references on the final slides.
I won't be showing them here---you can get them online.
My goal is to present you with enough information that you know that these
  things /exist/,
   and you know where to find more information about them.
Those unknown unknowns.

So: let's start with the obvious.

(Note: You're being "tracked", rather than "watched": the latter is too
often used and dismissed as tinfoil-hat FUD.)
#+END_COMMENT

#+BEGIN_CENTER
  #+BEAMER: \only<1->{\Huge You're Being Tracked.}

  #+BEAMER: \only<2>{\large(No, really, I have references.)}
#+END_CENTER


** AUGMENT Mobile [5/5]
*** READY Introduction                                    :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** READY Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- <1-> Most people carry mobile phones
- <1-> Synonymous with individual
- <2> Excellent tracking devices

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
How many of you are carrying a mobile phone right now?
Probably most of us.
They are something we carry with us everywhere.
They are computers that are always on.

A phone is often synonymous with an individual;
  they are a part of us.
In other words: they're excellent tracking devices.
#+END_COMMENT

*** READY Cell Towers [2/2]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 0:02
:END:
**** READY Fundamentally Needed
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.75
:END:
- Phone needs tower to make and receive calls
- Gives away approximate location\cite{pbs:nova:boston}

***** Tower Image
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.25
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/cell-tower.jpg]]

\incite{w:file:cell-tower}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The primary reason is inherent in a phone's design:
  cell towers.
A phone "needs" to be connected to a tower to make and receive calls.

Unless it is off or otherwise disconnected (like airplane mode),
  its connection to the cell tower exposes your approximate location.
If the signal reaches a second tower,
  the potential location can be calculated from the signal delay.
You can also triangulate.
These data persist for as long as the phone companies are willing to persist
  it.

Some people don't use phones primarily for this reason.

rms, for example, said he might use a phone if it could act as a pager,
  where he'd only need to expose his location once he is in a safe place.
You can imagine that such would be a very useful and important feature for
  reporters and dissidents as well.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Cell-Site Simulators
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.65
:END:
- <1-> IMSI-Catchers
- <1-> Masquerade as cell towers
- <1-> Most popular: Stingray
- <2-> Free/libre Android program AIMSICD available on F-Droid attempts to
       detect\cite{aimsid}

***** Stingray Image
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.35
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/stingray.jpg]]

\incite{w:file:stingray}
#+END_CENTER


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Cell Site Simulators have made a lot of news in the past (including my local
  news),
    one of the most popular examples being the Stingray.
These devices masquerade as cell towers.
This allows (for example) law enforcement to get a suspect's phone to
  connect to _their_ device rather than a real tower,
    which allows their location to be triangulated,
    calls to be intercepted,
    texts to be mined,
    etc.
Law enforcement might also use it to record all devices in an area,
  such as during a protest.

The problem is: _every_ phone in the area will try to connect to it;
  it amounts to a dragnet search,
    and is therefore extremely controversial.

The Android program AIMSICD---Android IMSI-Catcher Detector---is being
  developed in an attempt to detect these devices.
It is free software and is available on F-Droid.
#+END_COMMENT


*** READY Wifi [1/1]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 0:01
:END:

**** READY ESSID and MAC Broadcast
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:
- <1-> Device may broadcast ESSIDs of past hidden networks
- <1-> Expose unique hardware identifiers (MAC address)
- <2-> **Defending against this is difficult**
  - <3-> /Turn off Wifi/ in untrusted places
  - <3-> Turn off settings to auto-connect when receiving e.g. MMS
  - <4-> Use cellular data (e.g. {2,3,4}G)
  - <5-> **MAC address randomization works poorly**\cite{arxiv:mac}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
What else is inherent in a modern phone design?
A common feature is Wifi.

If you connected to any hidden networks,
  your phone may broadcast that network name to see if it exists.

It exposes unique device identifiers (MACs),
  which can be used to uniquely identify you.

Defending against this is difficult,
  unless you take the simple yet effective route:
    disable Wifi completely,
      at least when you're not in a safe area you can trust.
Some apps will automatically enable networking if they receive,
  for example,
  MMS messages;
    be careful of that.
If you really do need data,
  use your cellular data.
You are already hemmoraging information to your phone company,
  so at least you're limiting your exposure.

Some phones and apps offer MAC address randomization.
That's a good thing in priniciple.
Unfortunately, it seems to be easily defeated.
One study, cited here,
  claims to be able to defeat randomization 100% of the time,
  regardless of manufacturer.

/Segue to next section:/
All these previous risks are _passive_---
  they require no malicious software on your device.
But what if we _do_ have such software?
And of course, we do.
#+END_COMMENT


*** READY Geolocation [3/3]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 0:02
:END:

**** READY Global Positioning System (GPS)
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/tp/gps.jpg]]\incite{w:file:gps}
#+END_CENTER

- <1-> Not inherently a surveillance tool
- <2-> Often enabled, and programs abuse it\cite{jots:mobile}
  - <2-> Legitimate: navigation, social media, photos, nearby friends, finding
         lost phones, location-relative searches, etc.
- <3-> If phone is compromised, location is known

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Let's talk about geolocation!
Many people find them to be very convenient.
The most popular being GPS.

GPS isn't inherently a surveillance tool;
  it can't track you on its own.
Your GPS device calculates its location based on signals
  broadcast by GPS satellites in line-of-site.

Because of the cool features it permits,
  it's often enabled on devices.
And programs will track your movements just for the hell of it.
Or give an excuse to track you.

I'm not saying there aren't legitimate uses.
Navigation systems,
  social media,
  photo metadata,
  finding nearby friends,
  finding lost phones---
    all of these things are legitimate.
You just need to be able to trust the software that you are running,
Often times, you can't.

Even if you can,
  if your device is owned,
  they can just enable GPS and your location is known.
#+END_COMMENT

**** READY But I Want GPS!
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:
- <1-> Is the program transparent in what data it sends?  (Is the source code
       available?)\cite{jots:mobile}
  - <1-> 2010: 47 of top 100 Android and iOS apps sent location to devs and
         third parties\cite{wsj:app-loc}
  - <1-> Ex: /Angry Birds/ sent address book, location, and device ID to
         third party\cite{networks-of-control}
- <1-> Does the program let you disable those [anti-]features?
- <2-> Pre-download location-sensitive data (e.g. street maps)
  - <2-> OsmAnd (free software, Android and iOS)\cite{osmand}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So you may legitimately want GPS enabled.
It's terrible that you should be concerned about it.

Are the programs you're using transparent in what they're sending?
A precondition to that answer is source code;
  it's otherwise hard to say if a program is doing other things.

A study by the Wall Street Journal found that 47 of the 100 Android and iOS
  apps in 2010 shared your location with not only the developers,
    but also with third parties.

You need to know what data you're leaking so that you can decide whether
  or not you want to do so.
And you need the option to disable it.

Sometimes your location is leaked as a side-effect.
Navigation systems, for example, usually lazy-load map images.
Some apps let you use pre-downloaded maps,
  like OsmAnd,
  which is free software available on both Android and---if you must---iOS.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Location Services
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- <1-> No GPS?  No problem!
- <1-> Mozilla Location Services, OpenMobileNetwork, ...
       \cite{mozilla:loc-services,openmobilenetwork}
- <2-> Wifi Positioning System; Bluetooth networks;
       nearby cell towers\cite{w:wps}
  - <2-> Signal strength and SSIDs and MACs of Access Points
         \cite{w:trilateration,acm:spotfi,acm:lteye}
- <3-> Some gathered by Google Street View cars
- <3-> Your device may report back nearby networks to build a more
       comprehensive database
- <4-> Works even where GPS and Cell signals cannot penetrate
  - <4-> Can be /more/ accurate than GPS (e.g. what store in a shopping mall)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But GPS doesn't need to be available.
Have you ever used a map program on a computer that asked for your location?
How does it do that without GPS?

There are numerous services available to geolocate based on nearby access
  points, bluetooth networks, and cell towers.
Based on the signal strength of nearby WiFi networks,
  your position can be more accurately trangulated.

Some of these data are gathered by Google Street View cars.
Your phone might also be reporting back nearby networks in order to improve
  the quality of these databases.

Sometimes this can be more accurate than GPS.
And it works where GPS and maybe even cell service don't, such as inside
  shopping malls.

So just because GPS is off does not mean your location is unknown.
#+END_COMMENT

*** READY Operating System [3/3]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 0:02
:END:

**** READY Untrusted/Proprietary OS
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:

- <1-> Who does your phone work for?
  - Apple?  Google?  Microsoft?  Blackberry?  Your manufacturer too?
- <1-> Carry everywhere you go, but fundamentally cannot
  trust it\cite{gnu:malware-mobile}
- <2-> Some come with gratis surveillance
  - <2-> BLU phones sent SMS messages, contacts, call history, IMEIs, and
         more to third-party servers without users' knowledge or censent
         \cite{kryptowire:adups}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
A lot of this boils down to trust.
Who does your phone work for?

Does your phone work for Apple? Google? Microsoft? Blackberry?
Or does it work for you?

The OS situation on mobile is lousy.
You carry around this computer everywhere you go.
And you fundamentally cannot trust it.

Take BLU phones for example.
In November of last year it was discovered that these popular phones
  contained software that sent SMS messages, contact lists, call history,
  IMEIs, etc to third-party servers without users' knowledge or consent.
That software could also remotely execute code on the device.
#+END_COMMENT

**** READY Free/Libre Mobile OS?
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:
- <1-> Android is supposedly free software
  - <1-> But every phone requires proprietary drivers, or contains
         proprietary software
- <2-> Replicant\cite{replicant}
  - <2> Niche.  Largely work of one developer now.  (Help if you can!)

#+BEAMER: \uncover<2>{
#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :width: 7in
[[./images/tp/replicant.png]]
#+END_CENTER
#+BEAMER: }

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Android is supposedly a free operating system.
Unfortunately,
  every phone requires proprietary drivers to work,
  and is loaded with proprietary software.

Does anyone here use Replicant?
I do.
Replicant is a fully free Android fork.
I feel like I can at least trust my phone a little bit,
  but I still consider any data on it to be essentially compromised in the
  sense that I can't be confident in my ability to audit it and properly
  secure the device.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Modem Isolation
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- But modem still runs non-free software\cite{replicant:sec}
- Sometimes has access to CPU, disk, and memory\cite{replicant:samsung-bd}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But on nearly every phone,
  the modem still runs proprietary software.
And sometimes it has direct access to CPU, disk, and memory.
Replicant closed a backdoor in Samsung Galaxy phones that allowed for remote
  access to the disk.
That backdoor might not have been intentional,
  but it illustrates the possibility,
  and could still be exploited by an attacker.

So even with Replicant,
  I consider the device compromised;
    I put nothing important on it if I can avoid it.
#+END_COMMENT



** AUGMENT Stationary [5/5]
*** READY Introduction [1/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** READY Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
\large
``If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing
to\nbsp{}fear.''\cite{rosen:naked,solove:nothing-to-hide,metro:goebbels}
#+END_QUOTE

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So let's say you have evaded that type of tracking.
Maybe you don't carry a phone.
Or maybe you've mitigated those threats in some way.

There's certain things that are nearly impossible to avoid.

This quote.  We'll get back to it.
#+END_COMMENT

*** READY Surveillance Cameras (CCTV) [5/5]
**** READY Unavoidable Surveillance
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:10
:END:

- Certain types of tracking are unavoidable
- Security cameras are everywhere
  \cite{intercept:nyc-surveil,cbs:sf-smile,fast:das}
  - Businesses
  - Traffic
  - Streets/sidewalks
  - Public transportation

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
On the way here,
  you likely walked by numerous security cameras.
They could be security cameras for private businesses.
Traffic cameras.
Cameras on streets to deter crime.
#+END_COMMENT

**** READY Private Cameras in Plain View; Tinerloin, SF
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1.25in
[[./images/tp/sf-cameras.jpg]]
\incite{cbs:sf-smile}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
``The idea that you can sort of meet in a public place and quietly have a
conversation that we’re sort of accustomed to from spy movies, that is
really not realistic anymore,'' ---Nadia Kayyali, EFF\cite{cbs:sf-smile}
#+END_QUOTE

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is a map of private surveillance cameras in plain view around SF's
  Tenderloin neighborhood.
Obviously your city or town might be different.
Could be worse, even.
And these are just the ones that the DA's office found in
 /plain view/!

According to them,
  people who live in this neighborhood could be on camera dozens of times in
  a single day.

Alright, so a bunch of private entities have you on camera;
  So what?
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Access to Data
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

- <1-> Data can be obtained with a warrant or subpoena
- <2-> Data can be compromised
- <3-> Chilling effect
- <4-> **If you own a surveillance system, be responsible and considerate**
  - <4-> Best way to restrict data is to /avoid collecting it to begin with/

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Well one of the most obvious threats,
  should it pertain to you,
   is a warrant or subpoena.

Most of us aren't going to have to worry about a crime.
Data can be compromised.
And it isn't possible for you to audit it;
  you have no idea who has you on camera.

This creates a chilling effect.
You're going to act differently in public knowing that someone might be
  watching,
  or could be watching later on if recorded.
And some will be paranoid---you don't know if cameras are around.

If you have a surveillance system,
  or any sort of public-facing cameras,
  please be considerate.
If you only care who is on your property,
  don't record the sidewalk in front of your house.
Or at least restrict motion detection to your property.
The best form of privacy is to avoid having the data be collected to begin
  with.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Domain Awareness System (Intro)                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEGIN_LATEX
\only<1>{What if all those cameras---including private---were connected?}
\only<2>{\Huge NYPD\par Domain Awareness System\incite{nyc:pspg}}
\only<3>{
#+END_LATEX
#+BEGIN_QUOTE
  \large
  Although NYPD documents indicate that the system is specifically designed
  for anti-terrorism operations, any incidental data it collects ``for a
  legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose'' by DAS can be
  utilized by the police department.\cite{fast:das}
#+END_QUOTE
#+LATEX: }
#+END_CENTER


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
...but what if law enforcement didn't have to go door-to-door?

Let's talk about the NYPD's Domain Awareness System.

It was designed in part from the usual unjustifiable and irrational response
  to terrorism threats after 9/11.
But any data this system collects for ``legtimate'' law enforcement or
  public safety purposes can be used against you.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Domain Awareness System
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01:15
:END:

- <1-> Partnership between the NYPD and Microsoft at a cost of $230M
       in\nbsp{}2013\cite{reuters:nypd-das,nyc:pspg}
  - <1-> Surveillance cameras, license plate readers, radiation detectors,
         911\nbsp{}system, criminal records, \ldots
- <2-> \gt 6,000 surveillance cameras, $2\over 3$ private
       businesses\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston}
- <3-> Database of over 16\nbsp{}million plates,
       every car going into Lower Manhatten\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston}
- <4-> Can search in seconds for terms like
       ``red baseball cap''\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston}
- <4-> Detects ``suspicious behaviors'' like unattended bags and
       circling cars\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The Domain Awareness System is a partnership between Microsoft and the NYPD.
It's mammoth.
It's pretty amazing---it's like science fiction.
But I care about privacy,
  so instead I'm going to use adjectives like ``Orwellian'' and ``Kafkaesque''.

It contains over six thousand security cameras,
  over two-thirds of which are private closed-circuit cameras.
It includes license plate readers that record everyone going into Lower
  Manhattan, along with a database of over sixteen million license plates.
It can search in seconds for very specific terms,
  like ``red baseball cap'',
  and it can monitor for suspicious behaviors,
  like unattended bags,
  or cars circling an area.
If it finds an unattended bag,
  you can rewind to find who left it.

A lot of us are programmers---
  think about the realtime analysis of all of these frames.
It really is a fascinating field to work in.
But there's serious ethical concerns with how it's applied.

This thing also integrates the 911 system, radiation detectors, criminal
  records, etc.

This is the direction we're heading in---
  these things will only spread.
In fact,
  the NYPD will get 30% of the profits from selling it to others.
#+END_COMMENT


*** READY Driver Surveillance [3/3]
**** READY Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

***** Images
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
  [[./images/tp/alpr-mounted.png]]\par\incite{eff:alpr}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
  [[./images/tp/alpr-capture.png]]\par\incite{eff:alpr}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<3>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2in
  [[./images/tp/aclu-tracked.jpg]]\par\incite{aclu:tracked}
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:
- Scan passing cars' license plates\cite{aclu:tracked,eff:alpr}
- Produce alphanumeric representation with timestamp and photograph

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
I want to talk about a couple issues related to driver surveillance.
These things are a widespread, nasty threat to privacy,
  and they don't need a sophisticated Domain Awareness System to deploy.

The first are ALPRs.
ALPRs are mounted on police cars and objects like light poles.
They scan passing cars' license plates,
  convert them to alphanumeric data,
  record the time and date,
  and possibly an image of the vehcile.
Here's a screenshot of the interface of one;
  we'll get into how exactly we got that in a bit.
The ACLU has an excellent report on it,
  and the EFF has a campaign against it;
    see those two resources for more info.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Automatic Toll Readers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:
- <1-> Electronic toll booth using RFIDs or ALPRs\cite{eff:golden-gate-toll}
  - <1-> In the North-East we have E-ZPass (RFID)\cite{w:ezpass}
  - <1-> Golden Gate Bridge requires FasTrack or plate-based
  - <2-> /But/ they provide an option for an anonymous FasTrack account
        using cash\cite{goldengate:anon}
  - <2-> (Granted, you're still captured by an ALPR)
- <3-> Routinely used by law enforcement\cite{baynews:fastack-data}
- <4-> They're not very secure,
       either\cite{blackhat:toll-systems,register:rfid-clone}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The other is automatic toll readers.

Electronic toll booths are replacing traditional cash-based tolls.
Some places require it,
  like the Golden Gate Bridge.
I was unsettled when I heard my county discussing it.
One option is windshield-mounted RFIDs.
In the North-East, we have E-ZPass.
For the Golden Gate Bridge, FasTrack.

We've already seen that law enforcement uses these data,
  but in the case of FasTrack,
  data are even used in civil suits like divorces.

And they have their security issues;
  many can be easily cloned, for example.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Akin To GPS Tracking
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- /United States v. Jones/: GPS tracking constitutes search under
  Fourth\nbsp{}Amendment\cite{w:us-v-jones}

- How is pervasive surveillance different if it achieves essentially the
  same result?

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
In the US Supreme Court case United States v. Jones, the judges unanimously
  ruled that GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes a search under the
  Fourth Amendment.

Many wonder how tracking as I just described is any different.
If you have ALPRs and other surveillance systems throughout the same area
  within which a warrant for GPS tracking can be executed,
  you would get similar results.
With much less risk, too---no secret device that may be discovered.

That's for a court to eventually decide.
But it's a useful comparison against precedent.
#+END_COMMENT


*** AUGMENT Internet of Things [7/7]
**** READY Internet-Connected Cameras                        :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:35
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{Cameras used to need physical access}
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{Today\ldots not always so much}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
In the past, these cameras were on their own segregated networks.
You'd _have_ to subpoena the owner or get a warrant,
  or otherwise physically take the tape.

Today...that might be the intent, but these cameras are often
  connected to the Internet for one reason or another.
It might be intentional---to view the camera remotely or on a device---or it
  may just be how the camera is set up by default.

Well...
It's not just businesses that use Internet-connected cameras.
They're also popular among individuals for personal/home use so that they
  can view them on their smart phones and elsewhere.
Like home security systems.
Baby monitors.
#+END_COMMENT

**** READY The ``S'' In IoT Stands For ``Security''
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:50
:END:

- <1-> Shodan---IoT search engine\cite{shodan}
  - <2-> You'll also find other things.  Secure your databases.
         \cite{krebs:mongodb}
- <2-> Can search for specific devices
- <2-> If you are vulnerable, someone will find you
- <3-> Top voted search was ``Webcam'' when I was writing this slide

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Who here has heard of Shodan?

Shodan is a search engine for the Internet of Things.
It spiders for Internet-connected devices and indexes them.
Okay, that's to be expected.
Maybe that wouldn't be a problem if NAT configuration weren't subverted by
  UPnP.
Or maybe it wouldn't be a problem if these devices even gave a moment of
  thought to security.

It also indexes other interesting things.
For example,
  it was used to find unsecured MongoDB instances so that the attackers
  could hold data for ransom.
Secure your databases.

So people can find your stuff.
If an attacker knows that some device is vulnerable,
  Shodan can be used to search for that device.

At the time I was writing this,
  the top voted search under "Explore" was "Webcam".
Followed by "Cams", "Netcam", and "default password".
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Who's Watching?
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:20
:END:

***** Screenshot
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2.25in
[[./images/insecam-ss.png]]\par\incite{insecam}
#+END_CENTER


***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.70
:END:

- Insecam is a directory of Internet-connected surveillance
  cameras\cite{insecam}
- Live video feeds (browser connects directly to cameras)


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But Shodan isn't the only thing out there.
Anyone heard of Insecam?

It's a site that aggregates live video feeds of unsecured IP cameras.
Your browser connects directly to the cameras---
  literally, they are wide open;
    nothing fancy is going on here.
I can tell you personally that you feel like a scumbag looking at the site.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Insecam Example 1                                 :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/insecam-01.png]]
#+LATEX: \hspace{0.1in}
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/insecam-06.png]]

#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/insecam-03.png]]
#+LATEX: \hspace{0.1in}
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/insecam-05.png]]
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Here are some examples.
I blurred any identifying features for privacy.

We have surveillance rooms where people watch their surveillance system!
  Inception-kinda thing going on here.
  Also doesn't help that they are watching the TV on the wall too.

There's many public swimming pools.

Elevators are awkward enough to begin with.
  How about someone watching you in such a vulnerable space?

We have a photolithography lab in my home city.
I have no idea which one, or where exactly.

These are creepy.
Somewhat cool, even.
Let's get a little more personal.
#+END_COMMENT

**** READY Example 2                                         :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:01:00
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/insecam-02.png]]
#+LATEX: \hspace{0.1in}
#+LATEX: \only<2>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
  [[./images/insecam-04.png]]
#+LATEX: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
How about inside hospital rooms?
This patient has an ice pack strapped to the side of her face.
I'm pretty sure this feed was outside of the United States;
  I can't imagine that this type of thing would make it past HIPAA audits.
I hope.
I couldn't find the feed again to try to figure out what hospital it might
  be to notify them.

How about inside someone's home?
This looks to be a bedroom.
There is a family photo on the wall.
Oh yeah.

I saw someone at the dentist getting a teeth cleaning.
I didn't copy that photo at the time,
  and I can't find it now, fortunately.

This is an excellent example to demonstrate to others why this is such a big
  deal.
This should make anyone feel uncomfortable.

Especially those home cameras.
I wish I knew whose camera that was,
  so that they could be notified.
These people are unaware.
And these manufactuers set them up for this.

Even if you can't find a camera on this site,
  Shodan might have indexed it;
    just connect.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY ALPRs Wide Open
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:20
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1.5in
[[./images/tp/alpr-pips.png]]\incite{eff:alpr}
#+END_CENTER

- John Matherly (Shodon author) noticed many web-accessible PIPS
  control panels
- Other researcher found some accessible via telnet\cite{darius:alpr-telnet}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Speaking of just connecting.
Those ALPRs we just talked about.

Turns out that they have web interfaces.
John Matherly, the author of Shodon, found a number of control panels for
  PIPS ALPRs.
Another researcher found telnet access on some.
In both cases,
  license plate data could be extracted,
  and the system could be reconfigured.
#+END_COMMENT


**** READY Biometrics
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01:00
:END:

- <1-> Humans no longer need to scour video
       feeds\cite{eff:facial-tech,churchix,facefirst,pbs:nova:boston}
- <1-> Facial recognition widely used, even for
       mobile\nbsp apps\cite{register:fb-scan,eff:ios-photo-diff,eff:fbi-bio}
  - <2-> NYPD has a gallery of over 4M individuals\cite{pbs:nova:boston}
  - <2-> Quality can be low and pixelated; various machine learning
        algorithms\cite{pbs:nova:boston,wired:pixel-face,arxiv:google-pixel-res}
- <3-> No face?  Check your gait.\cite{ieee:gait,ijca:gait}
- <4-> No gait?  Well\ldots whatever, just ask Facebook.\cite{newsci:fb-noface}
- <5-> Even fingerprints and iris from high-resolutions photos\cite{bio:iris}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Now let's couple that with facial recognition.

Consider the breadth of devices we just covered.
Literally everywhere.
People don't need to manually look for you anymore;
  it's automated.
Hell, any of us can download a free (as in freedom) library to do facial
  recognition and train it to recognize people.
It doesn't even have to be clear---
  there's machine learning algorithms to reconstruct pixelated faces with
  somewhat decent accuracy to be useful.
The NYPD has over 4 million people's images in a database that they compare
  against during facial recognition.

Don't have a face?
You can also be identified by your gait.
No gait?
Facebook famously got even creepier by saying it could recognize people by
  their dress, posture, and hair, without even seeing their face.

Your fingerprints and iris data can even be extracted from high-resolution
  photos;
  a cracker used such a method to defeat Apple's TouchID by making a mould.

There's a lot more to say about IoT.
We'll come back to it.
#+END_COMMENT


*** READY Social Media [1/1]
**** READY Collateral Damage
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

- <1-> Please don't put pictures of me on Facebook\cite{rms:facebook}
- <1-> Don't put pictures of my children _anywhere_\cite{techcrunch:fb-baby}
- <2-> That person in the distance is collateral
       damage\cite{register:fb-scan,guardian:fb-scan,pbs:nova:boston}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So you don't have any unsecured IoT cameras in your home.
Or in this conference.
But you do have unsecured people running wild with their photos and their
  selfies.

I'm sure you've heard a frequent request/demand from rms:
"Don't put pictures of me on Facebook."
It's excellent surveillance.
What irks me is when people try to take pictures of my kids,
  or do and ask if they can put them online.
Uh, no.  You cannot.
And people are sometimes surprised by that refusal.

Most people are being innocent---
  they're just trying to capture the moment.
What they're actually doing is inflicting collateral damage.
If I'm off in the background when you take a picture of your friends in the
  foreground,
  I'm still in the photo.
Just something to consider when taking photos of others..
#+END_COMMENT


** REVIEWED The Web [0/7]
*** REVIEWED Introduction [0/1]                           :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** REVIEWED Introduction                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:10
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge Fleshy You $\Longleftrightarrow$ Virtual You
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But you're not just tracked in the flesh.
Much of what we do today is virtual.
So, naturally, there are those that want to bridge them.
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED Bridging the Gap [0/3]
**** REVIEWED FTC: They're Watching You                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
  [[./images/ftc-silver.png]]\incite{ftc:silver}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is a sample letter template from the FTC.
It states: <read paragraph>.
A challenge for advertisers is correlating users across multiple devices,
  and in the real world.

Let's say you saw a commercial for some product Foo on TV.
And then you went online to research Foo.
And then you bought Foo.

Sometimes commercials have you enter promo codes online to know that you
  arrived at the site from a TV commercial.
Or give you a unique URL.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Ultrasound Tracking
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
#+BEGIN_CENTER
\cdots $\Longleftrightarrow$ TV $\Longleftrightarrow$
Retail Store $\Longleftrightarrow$
Mobile $\Longleftrightarrow$ Web $\Longleftrightarrow$ \cdots
#+END_CENTER

- Correlates users across devices; airgap
  bridge\cite{ubeacsec:paper,wired:ultrasonic}
  - Inaudible to humans
- Could deanonymize (e.g. Tor users)\cite{33c3:talk-behind,bleep:ultrasound-tor}
#+BEAMER: }

#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/silverpush-logo.png]]
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
``Silverpush could generate a detailed log of the television
  content viewed while a user’s mobile phone was
  turned\nbsp{}on.''\cite{ftc:silver}
#+END_QUOTE
#+BEAMER: }

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Others play inaudible sounds that are picked up by your mobile device or
  computer.

This has other serious implications.
There are concerns, for example, about this method being able to be used to
  deanonymize Tor users.

In that letter, FTC mentions Silverpush by name.
There are other companies too;
  see the references.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking (uXDT)
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

- <1-> Termed ``Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking''
       (uXDT)\cite{bleep:ultrasound-tor,ftc:xdt}
- <1-> Mitigations?
  - <2-> SilverDog is a Chromium addon to filter HTML5 audio\cite{ubeacsec:paper}
  - <3-> Researchers propose Android permission system change
  - <4-> Don't install software that keep secrets (proprietary)
  - <5-> Don't run untrusted code on websites (use e.g. NoScript)
  - <6-> Turn off your device when not in use
  - <6-> Keep device away from other media

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is termed ``Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking'',
  or simply ``Cross-Device Tracking''.
How do you go about mitigating this type of threat?

Well, researchers studying this issue wrote SilverDog,
  a Chromium addon to filter HTML5 audio to remove ultrasonic frequencies.
That doesn't help with TorBrowser, though, which is FF-based.
The reserachers also propose a change to the Android permission system for
  audio.

This type of thing only works when you're keeping some serious secrets.
That's easy to do with proprietary software.
Much riskier to do (but not impossible) with free software.
For websites, don't run untrusted JavaScript code;
  block it with an addon like NoScript.
We'll get into that in a little bit.

You can also turn off the device when not in use,
  and maybe keep it away from other media.
This is far from the only mobile threat;
  you may want to take precautions for other things anyway.
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED Analytics [0/4]
**** REVIEWED Introduction                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1-3>{\Huge Data Analytics}

#+BEAMER: \only<2-3>{\LARGE (Building User Profiles)}

#+BEAMER: \only<3>{\large (Tracking)}

#+BEAMER: \only<4->{\Huge Spyware}

#+BEAMER: \only<5>{\LARGE (With Science)}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This all leads into a larger subject called ``data analytics''.

Which is really just building, analyzing, and aggregating user profiles.

Which is generally called tracking.

...which we usually just call spyware.
But this has science!
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Trackers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

- <1-> Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing
  - <1-> That in itself isn't an unreasonable concept
- <2-> Methods and data define the issue

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing.
That in itself isn't an unreasonable thing, broadly speaking,
  but how you go about it and what types of data you collect
  defines the issue.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Google Analytics
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

***** GA Dashboard
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.45
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1.5in
[[./images/tp/ga-dashboard.png]]

\incite{google:ga:features}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
[[./images/analytics-usage.png]]
\incite{w3techs:analytics}
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

***** Description
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.45
:END:

- <1-> User location, screen resolution, time on page, heatmap,
       etc\cite{w:behavioral-targeting}
- <1-> Unique identifier assigned
- <1-> Fine-grained reporting for site owner
- <2-> Knows many sites user visited across Web\cite{w3techs:google}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Take Google Analytics for example.
It is one of the most widely distributed spyware programs in the world.

It collects a variety of user data.
A lot of it really is what website owners want to know:
  geography, screen resolution, time on the page, heatmaps, etc.
Except...

And all of this is known to Google.
And because services like GA, AdWords, etc are so widely used,
  all of this can be used to identify users across the entire web.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Piwik
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
If you must track your users, consider using Piwik, which you can host
  yourself.
This means that your visitor data aren't stored and accessible by Google or
  other companies.
Pwik has some user privacy settings to anonymize, remove logs, respect DNT,
  provide opt-out, etc.
It also gives website owners some privacy by not leaking paths and other
  information about the website:
#+END_COMMENT

***** Dashboard
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.65
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/piwik-dashboard.png]]

\incite{piwik}
#+END_CENTER


***** Description
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.35
:END:

- <2-> Data on **your own servers**\cite{mtg:gitlab-piwik}
- <2-> Visitor privacy settings\cite{piwik:privacy}
- <2-> Privacy as a site owner


*** REVIEWED Social Networking
**** REVIEWED Like Buttons
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1.5in
[[./images/tp/fb-like.png]]\incite{w:fb-like-img}
#+END_CENTER

- <2-> Infecting the Web with trackers under guise of
       community\cite{pnas:predict,w:behavioral-targeting,uld:fb}
- <2-> Tracks regardless of whether you are logged in to Facebook
       \cite{bloomberg:belgum-fb,roosendaal:fb-like}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Another popular example are "like buttons" and similar little widgets that
  websites like Facebook offer.
It might help get the word out about your stuff,
  but please don't fall into the trap of betraying your visitors.
Please don't fall into the trap of clicking it, either---
  it's easy to infer a great deal of information about you from what you
  "like".

If a user is logged into Facebook,
  then Facebook now knows that they visited that website,
 _even if they don't click on the button_.

But even if you don't have a Facebook account,
  you are still being tracked.
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED Fingerprinting [0/3]
**** REVIEWED Summary                                        :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:
#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge Fingerprinting
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These methods are part of a broader topic called ``fingerprinting''.
It's just what it sounds like:
  uniquely identify users online.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED EFF Research                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:20
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
EFF Research, 2010:\cite{eff:browser-uniqueness-blog,eff:browser-uniqueness}

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
``In our analysis of anonymized data from around half a million distinct
browsers, 84% had unique configurations. Among browsers that had Flash or
Java installed, 94% were unique, and only 1% had fingerprints that were seen
more than twice.''
#+END_QUOTE
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
That was seven years ago.

You're really screwed today.*

#+BEGIN_LATEX
\incite{eff:panopti2,eff:browser-uniqueness,mozilla:fingerprinting,%
        chromium:identification,tor:browser-design,stanford:private-browsing,%
        norte:tor-fingerprint,browserleaks,ars:fingerprint,hardware-fingerprint}
#+END_LATEX
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Back in 2010,
  the EFF released a paper with results from their fingerprinting research
  project Panopticlick.
Back then,
  they had an 84% success rate;
    even higher with Flash and Java.

But we ain't in 2010 anymore.
We have options.
Very creative ones.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Alarmingly Effective
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:

- Panopticlick (EFF)\cite{panopti:about}
- User Agent, cookies, screen resolution, fonts, language, session storage,
  canvas, WebGL, ad blocker, audio, keystrokes,
    mouse movement,\nbsp{}\ldots\cite{ijcseit:biometric}
- Can even track separate browsers on the same
  hardware\cite{hardware-fingerprint,ars:fingerprint}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Fingerprinting is alarmingly effective.
We don't have time to get into much detail on how it works;
  I provided plenty of resources for that.
But there are some interesting ones.

We don't just have to rely on basic browser-provied information like user
  agent, fonts, and cookies anymore.
How about tracking how the user moves her mouse and scrolls?
What about keystroke analysis?
Random noise from audio?
Time of CPU-intensive tasks like rendering 3D elements?

Some of these methods are hardware-based.
They can fingerprint even if the user opens a different browser,
  or maybe even a different operating system,
  on the same box.

Some are behavioral.
Keystroke patterns will persist wherever the user goes.

We'll get into some defenses in a bit.
#+END_COMMENT



*** REVIEWED Incentive to Betray [0/2]
**** REVIEWED Summary                                        :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
There is strong incentive to betray
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So how does tracking happen?
How does this tracking code _get_ on so much of the web?

Incentives to betray users.

Many websites make money through advertising.
It can be lucrative.
And it's _easy_ to do.

Others get addicted to attention and praise.

Others simply want to know what their visitors are doing on their website.

Most website owners don't think or know about these issues.
They're unknowing pawns in the Web of surveillance.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Web of Surveillance                               :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2.5in
[[./images/lightbeam-ex.png]]

\incite{moz:lightbeam}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2.5in
[[./images/lightbeam-ex-good.png]]

(After mitigations)
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
And I do mean a Web of surveillance.

This is LightBeam.
It's an addon for Firefox that graphs first- and third-party sites that you
  visit,
  providing you with a visualization of the Web that's hidden from most
  users.
I created a new FF profile and installed the addon;
  none of my privacy settings or other addons I'm used to.
You can see at the top that I visited five websites:
  Washington Post, NY Times from Google, Guargian, and---which you can't see
  here because they're actually disjoint from this graph---The Intercept.
  Good for them!
And yet,
  it hit /86/ third party sites!
NYT alone connected to 47 different third parties!

I was blown away.


Some of these are trackers.
Some of them are remotely hosted scripts and fonts and media.

So let me show you what I'm used to seeing.
This is what happens when I try to mitigate some of these threats.
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED Mitigations & Anonymity [0/8]
**** REVIEWED Summary                                        :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:05
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge How Do We Mitigate?
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So how do we do that?

Well, it depends on your threat model,
  but let's start with the easy stuff.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Disable the Damn JavaScript!
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1.5in
[[./images/tp/noscript.png]]
#+END_CENTER

#+BEAMER: \only<2-3>{
- <2-3> Preempt most sophisticated and damning fingerprinting methods
  - <2-3> Stop hardware profiling
  - <2-3> Stop keystroke/mouse analysis\cite{ijcseit:biometric}
  - <3> Remember those audio beacons?\cite{bleep:ultrasound-tor}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<4-5>{
- <4-> Running arbitrary untrusted, unsigned, ephemeral code
       (/also\nbsp{}from many third parties/)\cite{mtg:rof}
  - <4-> /Restore Online Freedom!/ (My LibrePlanet 2016 talk)
  - <5-> LibreJS blocks non-free, but free doesn't mean free of malice
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<6>{
- NoScript blocks JavaScript based on URL patterns\cite{noscript}
  - /Warning:/ Allows some sites by default!
  - Also blocks media and fonts; provides XSS and clickjacking prevention
#+BEAMER: }

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Okay, I can't say this enough.
Disable the damn JavaScript!
The Web isn't broken without it,
  they're breaking the web /with/ it!
I write a lot of JavaScript for a living.
My GNU project is ease.js, which is a JavaScript library.
And yet,
 /I do not allow JavaScript to run 99% of the time!/.
Even on most websites I trust.
Some people run LibreJS.
But note that free software doesn't mean free of malice.

It's probably obvious from the logo that I'm talking about the NoScript
  extension.
It does more than just block JS---
  it also blocks media, custom fonts, prevents against certain types of XSS
  and clickjacking attacks, and more.
If you don't know what XSS and clickjacking is, that's okay.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED LightBeam NoScript                             :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2.5in
[[./images/lightbeam-ex.png]]

(Before NoScript)
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2.5in
[[./images/lightbeam-ex-noscript.png]]

(After NoScript)
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So this was our graph before NoScript.

And here it is after disabling scripts.
Without any other mitigations.

Obviously results will vary depending on the website.

We're going to get back to JS soon.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Block Ads and Trackers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:
#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 0.75in
[[./images/tp/privacy-badger.png]]
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 0.75in
[[./images/tp/ublock0.png]]
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 0.75in
[[./images/tp/sdcookies.png]]
#+END_CENTER

- /Privacy Badger/ blocks trackers\cite{eff:privacy-badger,lp:2016:privacy-badger}
- /uBlock_0/ filters (primarily) ads\cite{gh:ublock-origin}
- /Self-Destructing Cookies/ clears cookies and
  LocalStorage\cite{moz:sd-cookies}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The issue surrounding Ad Blockers is framed such that we're waging war
  against advertisers.
No---they're waging war against /us/.

You'll find that the bulk of what these addons for Firefox browsers handle
  is related to ad networks.
Privacy Badger works to block sites that appear to be tracking you.
Cooper Quintin---developer of Privacy Badger---gave a great talk last year
  here at LP; go check it out.
uBlock Origin describes itself as a ``wide-spectrum blocker'',
  but it serves primarily as an ad blocker.
Self-Destructing cookies clears out a site's cookies and LocalStorage once a
  tab is closed.
There may be better options out there;
  this seems to be useful for me.

I don't have time to go into technical details, unfortunately.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Anonymity                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
#+BEAMER: {\Huge Anonymity}

\bigskip
Origin is unknown to server; no unique identifier known
by\nbsp{}server\incite{whonix:donot}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
#+BEAMER: {\Huge Pseudonymity}

\bigskip
Origin is unknown to server; unique identifier /is\nbsp{}available/
to\nbsp{}server\incite{whonix:donot}
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Another way is to be anonymous or pseudononymous.
In the latter case,
  you assume a pseudoynm online and perform only activities that should be
  associated with that pseudonym.
In the former case,
  there should be no way to ever correlate past or future actions with your
  current session.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED IANAAE                                         :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:10
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: {\Huge IANAAE}

(I Am Not An Anonymity Expert)
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is a difficult topic that's pretty dangerous to give advice on if you
  have strong need for anonymity---for example, if you are a dissident or
  whistleblower.
If your life depends on anonymity,
  please do your own research.
I provide a number of resources to get you started.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED The Tor Network
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
  [[./images/tp/tor.png]]
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
  [[./images/tp/tor-diagram.png]]
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

- <1> The Onion Router (Tor)\cite{tor}
- <1> Helps defend against traffic analysis

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Most here have probably heard of Tor.
Its purpose is to protect against certain kinds of traffic analysis.

"Tor" stands for "The Onion Router",
  which describes how it relays data through the Tor network.

The packet is routed through a number of servers,
  encrypted with the public key of each server such that the first hop
  strips off the first layer and so on,
    like an onion.
The exit node reveals the packet and delivers it to the destination,
  then begins relaying the reply back to through the network to the
  requesting user.

As long as a sufficient portion of the network can be trusted and has not
  been compromised by an adversary,
  it isn't possible to trace data back through the network.

The most common use of Tor is to route web traffic.

There are lots of other details that I don't have time to get to here,
  but I provide a number of resources for you.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
  [[./images/tp/torbrowser.png]]
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<3>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
  [[./images/tp/tails.png]]
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<4>{
  #+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
  [[./images/tp/whonix.png]]
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
- Also need to change browsing habits\cite{whonix:donot}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
- Browser needs to be hardened
  - Remember: browser leaks a lot of
    data\cite{panopti:about,eff:browser-uniqueness}
  - TorBrowser is a hardened Firefox derivative\cite{tor:browser,tor:browser-design}
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<3->{
- <3-> Operating System needs to be hardened
  - <3-> Tails---The Amnesic Incognito Live System\cite{tor:tails}
  - <4> Whonix---Multi-layer isolation in VMs\cite{whonix}
#+BEAMER: }

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But Tor alone isn't enough to secure your anonymity.
You also have to change your browsing habits.
That is difficult and nuanced advice to give,
  let alone in a mention in a talk,
  so I defer to my citations.

For some people, that's enough.
If your threat model involves only advertisers and other snoopers,
  you might be okay with Tor and privacy extensions.
For nearly all of my Web traffic,
  that's what I care about.

But if you're a dissident,
  and your life is in danger,
  you have more work to do.
If you are worried about government surveillance or cracking,
  you have more work to do.

It's hard to secure a web browser.

TorBrowser is a hardened version of Firefox.
The Tor browser recommends that you don't rely on a vanilla Firefox for
  anonymity with Tor.

The operating system needs hardening.
There are two major options.
The first one is Tails: The Amnesic Incognito Live System.
It is an ephemeral OS that you can simply boot from USB on any PC.
It routes all traffic through the Tor network.

The second is Whonix.
It is not ephemeral: it requires a host OS (or hypervisor) and runs two VMs:
  one is the guest that the user uses as a desktop,
  and the other is the VM it routes all traffic through,
    which goes through Tor.
If the guest the user is using is compromised,
  an attacker cannot subvert the Tor network.

There's obvious tradeoffs there for both;
  I encourage you to look into both before deciding which is best for your
  threat model.
#+END_COMMENT


** REVIEWED Data and Profiling [0/3]
*** REVIEWED Introduction                                 :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** REVIEWED Introduction                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:05
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{
\Huge ``Big Data''

(/Your/ Big Data)
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{
\Huge ``Business Intelligence''
#+BEAMER: }
#+BEAMER: \only<3>{
\Huge ``Data Brokers''
#+BEAMER: }
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
We've seen adversaries with different motives.
Let's explore what some of them do with all those data.
#+END_COMMENT

*** REVIEWED Those Who Spy
**** REVIEWED Data Brokers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:END:

***** Lightbeam Reminder
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:

[[./images/lightbeam-ex.png]]

***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:

- Ghostery lists *over 3,000 companies receiving web/app
  data*\cite{ghostery:companies}


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Back to that Lightbeam graph of third parties.
Ghostery has a list of third parties receiving web and app data.
There's over 3,000 of them.

Looking at this graph from a few sites,
  that might not be too surprising.
#+END_COMMENT

**** REVIEWED Oracle Identity Graph
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2in
[[./images/tp/oracle-id-fuu.png]]
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
\footnotesize ``Aggregates and provides insights on over $2\nbsp{}trillion in
consumer spending from 1,500 data partners across 110 million US
households''\cite{oracle:datalogix-acq}
#+END_QUOTE

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Look how happy she is to be tracked!
I'm kidding of course.
If we put some random person's picture in her place,
  they might feel a bit uncomfortable.

<Read quote>

Look at that last bullet point there.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED All About the Experience                       :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:DURATION: 00:00:05
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge ``More Relevant Customer Experience''
#+END_CENTER


**** REVIEWED Target Pregnancy Prediction
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:25
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/tp/target-logo.png]]
#+END_CENTER

- <1-> Records purchases, credit cards, coupons, surveys, refunds, customer
       helpline calls, email, website visits, \ldots\cite{networks-of-control}
- <1-> Purchase more information from third parties\cite{networks-of-control}
- <2-> Identified 25 products to create a ``pregnancy prediction'' score and
       estimate due date\cite{nyt:learn-secrets}
  - <2-> Quantities of types of lotions, soaps, cotton balls,
         supplements,\nbsp{}etc

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
One of the most popular examples of these types of analytics is a case where
  a father received coupons for baby clothes in the mail for his daughter.
Target successfully predicted that she was pregnant based on certain items
  that she purchased,
    like quantities of certain lotions,
    and even things like cotton balls.
They call this a ``pregnancy prediction''.
It's creepy.
It's lucrative.
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED Transparency Needed
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:40
:END:

***** Trustev Graph
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/trustev-graph.png]]

\incite{trustev:tech}
#+END_CENTER

***** Summary
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_col: 0.50
:END:
- *Let users see their data in this graph!*
- Erase nonpublic information that they don't want to be known
- Let them correct what is wrong
  - <3> Also a problem with law enforcement / government
- <2-> Let them *opt out!*

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Look, at the end of the day,
  some people do legitimately want this.
They want to have this ``relevant customer experience''.

What we need is transparency.

Companies like Oracle should let you see your data in this graph.
Let you correct it if it's wrong.
Erase it if it's nonpublic information that you don't want to be known.
And allow you to /opt out/!

We talked about government surveillance a while ago.
This is a problem there as well.
What if you're flagged as suspicious?
Put on some no-fly list or terrorism watch list?
What if it were based on completely wrong information inferred by some
  algorithm?

Let's look at that graph on the left a little more closely.
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED These Data Affect Your Life!
**** REVIEWED Trustev Fraud Detection
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:25
:END:
#+BEGIN_CENTER
[[./images/tp/trustev-graph.png]]

\incite{trustev:tech}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is a graph of sources for TransUnion's fraud prevention system.
There are a lot of data sources here.
And look at the node at the bottom---
  ``machine learning''.

What if this were wrong?
You'd be flagged as a fraud.
This could be inconvenient---
  like not being able to make an online purchase.
But what if you are denied a loan because of things like this?
Or...denied employment?
#+END_COMMENT


**** REVIEWED LexisNexis
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:45
:END:
#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 0.25in
[[./images/tp/lexisnexis.png]]
#+END_CENTER

- Risk management for insurance, finance, retail, travel,
  government, gaming, and healthcare\cite{networks-of-control}
- Data on over 500 million customers
- TrueID---34 billion records from over 10,000 sources\cite{lexisnexis:trueid}

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
``We help insurers assess their risk and streamline the underwriting process
in 99% of all U.S. auto insurance claims and more than 90% of all homeowner
claims.''
#+END_QUOTE

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
There's a ton of these companies;
  we only have time for a few.
LexisNexis is another popular one.
And it's fun to say.

They handle risk management for various industries.
And they pull from a pool of data of over 500 million customers.

<read quote>

To give you an idea of their scale:
  they also have a system called TrueID,
    which does identity verification for fraud detection.
  They aggregate tens of billions of records from over ten thousand sources.
#+END_COMMENT

**** REVIEWED Palantir
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:25
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 1in
[[./images/tp/palantir.png]]
#+END_CENTER

- Co-founded by Peter Thiel of PayPal
- CIA, DHS, NSA, FBI, the CDC, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, Special
  Operations Command, West Point, the Joint IED-defeat organization and
  Allies, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and the
  National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.\cite{techcrunch:palantir}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Another highly controversial one is Palantir.
It was started by one of the co-founders of PayPal, Peter Thiel,
  for terrorism intelligence.
It's now used for its powerful analytic capabilities
  by not only private corporations,
    but numerous government agencies,
    a few of them being the CIA, DHS, FBI, and the NSA itself.

Yeah.
What if these data are wrong?
#+END_COMMENT


*** REVIEWED More Information

**** REVIEWED Networks of Control                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:15
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
#+ATTR_LATEX: :height 2in
[[./images/tp/networks-of-control.png]]

\incite{networks-of-control,33c3:surveil}

Shock and Awe
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
If this topic interests you,
  you need to read the paper Networks of Control.
One of the authors gave a talk at the recent Chaos Communication Congress,
  and I was in both shock and awe.
I've only had the chance to skim the paper.
Both are referenced here.
#+END_COMMENT

** LACKING Policy and Government [0/6]
*** DRAFT Introduction [0/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- <1-> Governments have a duty to protect their people
- <2-> Governments have a duty to protect citizens' rights

#+BEGIN_LATEX
\vspace{2ex}
\only<3>{
  \begin{center}
    These duties are often at odds
  \end{center}
}
#+END_LATEX

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Where to begin.

Governments have a duty to protect their people.
But they also have a duty to know their bounds;
  to protect citizens' rights and privacy.

We know how that story goes.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Surveillance [0/7]
**** DRAFT History of NSA Surveillance
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- <1-> EFF has been fighting NSA domestic spying
       since 2005\cite{eff:nsa:timeline,mtg:uproar}
- <1-> AT&T technician Mark Klein
- <1-> Dragnet surveillance; NSA-controlled ``SG3 Secure Room''
- <2-> Hepting v. AT&T (2006)
  - <2-> Government and AT&T retroactive immunity through FAA (2008)
- <2-> Jewel v. NSA (2008)
  - <2-> Summary of Voluminous Evidence

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
When we think of the term ``surveillance'',
  the NSA usually comes to mind.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been fighting the NSA
  in court since 2006.
In 2005, a former AT&T technician Mark Klein provided ``undisputed
  evidence'' about an NSA-controlled room at AT&T named ``SG-3'', through
  which all traffic passed.

The EFF filed Hepting v. AT&T in 2006.
But in 2008, both the government and AT&T were awarded retroactive immunity
  through the FISA Amendments Act.
The case was dismissed in 2009, along with dozens of other lawsuits.

In response,
  the EFF filed Jewel v. NSA.
The case also benefitted from three additional whistleblowers.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Ron Wyden                                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

Senator Ron Wyden, 26 May 2011:

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
I have served on the Intelligence Committee for over a decade and I wish to
deliver a warning this afternoon. When the American people find out how
their government has secretly interpreted [the business records provision of
FISA], they are going to be stunned and they are going to be angry.
#+END_QUOTE


**** DRAFT The Leak                                          :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
5 June 2013
#+END_CENTER


**** DRAFT Verizon Metadata
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- <1-> 5 June 2013---Guardian releases leaked document ordering Verizon to
  collect ``telephony metadata''

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
  [...] (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
  United States, including local telephone calls.
#+END_QUOTE

- <2-> ``Business records'' provision partly declassified by Clapper on 6 June 2013

- <2-> The American people were stunned and angry
  - <2-> But it wasn't a surprise to many

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
June 5th 2013.
I remember where I was.
Does anyone remember what that date represents?

The Guardian newspaper releases a leaked court order,
  which orders Verizon to collect ``telephony metadata'' on /all/ calls,
 /including local/.

That ``business records'' provision of FISA that Ron Wyden was talking about
  was partly declassified by the then-DNI James Clapper on June 6th, 2013.

As Wyden predicted,
  we were pretty stunned.
And pretty pissed off.

But it wasn't a surprise to many security researchers.
You guys can take a look at the references for more information on that.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT PRISM
- 6 June 2013---Guardian leaks slideshow describing PRISM

- All companies denied involvement

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But it didn't end there!
Well, obviously, we know that now.

One day later,
  the Guardian releases a leaked slideshow that describes PRISM.

All companies eventually denied involvement in this program.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Snowden
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- 9 June 2013---The Guardian reveals Edward Snowden as the whistleblower

- Smear campaign


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These were serious leaks.
They still are.
And three days later---to our surprise---the source of the leaks was
  revealed.

And the world came to know Edward Snowden through a huge smear campaign.
They pointed out that his girlfriend was a pole dancer.
They tried to discredit his role at the agency.
They tried to paint him as this social loner, and downplay his skills.

Fortunately, that conversation didn't last long, and did not succeed.
I'm not sure how many of you were here last year,
  but Snowden gave the opening keynote to LP2016.
He received a minute-long standing ovation.
The energy in that room was incredible.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID Tools
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- XKeyscore and others
- Exploits
- Hardware
- Intercepting shipments
- Etc.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Crypto Wars [0/6]
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge History repeats itself
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
All of that happened behind our backs.

But there is also a war being waged in public.
As if we haven't learned from the past.
The Crypto wars.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Export-Grade Crypto
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01:30
:END:

- <1-> Cryptography classified as munitions (Arms Export Control Act; ITAR)
- <1-> ``Export-grade'' cryptography
- <2-> Lotus Notes
  - <2-> 40-bit export-grade symmetric key
  - <3-> Agreement with NSA: 64-bit export, but 24 of those bits a "workload
    reduction factor" for the NSA
- <4-> Phil Zimmerman: PGP (\geq 128 bits)
  - <4-> Formal investigation by US government in 1993
  - <4-> Published source code in a book, which could be OCR'd
- <5-> Still suffer long-term effects today
       (downgrade attacks, e.g. POODLE)\cite{poodle:paper}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Back in the 1990s,
  cryptography was classified as munitions.

If you wanted to export it to other countries,
  you essentially had to make it crackable by the NSA.

Lotus Notes is often used as an example of the negative effects of such
  regulation.
Interestingly, it was actually the first widely used software to use
  public-key cryptography.
Due to export restrictions,
  the maximum symmetric key size they could support was 40 bits.
This was easily crackable by the NSA,
  but also feasible for other adversaries.
They compromised with the NSA:
  64-bit keys, but 24 of those bits would be encrypted specially for the NSA
  as a "workload reduction factor".
So you had protection against most adversaries,
  but not the US government.

Then we have Phil Zimmerman, author of PGP.
He didn't consult the NSA.
Instead, he published the source code for PGP in a book with MIT Press,
  and widely distributed it.
If someone wanted to use PGP,
  they could unbind the book, OCR the pages, and compile it with GCC.
The US government opened a formal investigation into the case in 1993;
  the charges were dropped years later.

We are still observing the fallout from export-grade crypto today.
They are called "downgrade attacks",
  where a program such as a browser is tricked into using a weaker
  cipher or keysize,
    allowing an attacker to MitM the connection.
POODLE is an example of this.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Bernstein v. United States
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:
- <1-> 1995: Bernstein v. US Department of Justice\cite{eff:bernstein:doj}
  - <1-> Argued that restrictions violated First Amendment
  - <2-> **Code Is Speech**
- <1-> 1996: Bill Clinton Executive Order 13026 transferred to Commerce
       Control List\cite{fedr:export-controls}
- <1-> Department of Commerce relaxed rules in 2000\cite{doc:rev-export-reg}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
In order to publish information on encryption algorithms and the like,
  you had to get permission from the government.

In 1995, Daniel Bernstein---then a graduate student---wanted to publish the
  source code and mathematical papers for his encryption algorithm
 /Snuffle/.
Like Zimmerman,
  Bernstein thought export restrictions to be a violation of his First
  Amendment rights.
But instead of blatant defiance,
  he decided to sue the US government.
He was represented by the EFF.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in his favor.

The following year, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order that
  removed encryption from the munitions list,
    and in 2000 the Department of Commerce relaxed export restrictions.

You might have heard the term "code is speech".
Bernstein v. United States case had wide-reaching consequences,
  not just for cryptography.
Source code is protected under the First Amendment.

(See also Junger v. Daley.)
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT The First Crypto Wars
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> These incidents part of the first Crypto Wars\cite{w:crypto-wars}
- <2-> DES Originally 64-bit key; NSA wanted 48 bits; compromised at 56.
- <2-> Two version of the browser: 128-bit "U.S. edition" and effective
         40-bit "international".
- <3-> **Clipper Chip** was a hardware backdoor that employed a key escrow
       system
  - <3-> Complete failure
  - <3-> Terribly insecure (property of key escrow in general)
  - <3-> Opposite effect: spurred development of Nautilus and PGPfone

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These incidents are classified into a period of time informally described as
  the "Crypo Wars".

There's a couple other good examples that I don't have time to get into:
  The DES encryption algorithm, for example, was originally 64-bit;
    the NSA wanted 48-bit, but compromised with 56.
  Netscape had /two versions of their browser/: one with 128-bit SSL and the
    other with 88 of those bits exposed to meet export regulations.
This sounds insane today---because it is.

But there's even more insanity.

The Clipper Chip!
It was the US government's attempt to backdoor communications with hardware.
It used a key escrow system,
  and the algorithm they devised---called Skipjack---was classified,
  and so could not be reviewed by crypto experts at the time.
Backlash was large.
It failed miserably.
Later cryptanalysis yielded scathing flaws,
  as is generally the case with key escrow cryptosystems.
It even had the opposite effect:
  it spurred the development of encrypted communication programs like
  Nautilus and PGPfone (the latter being proprietary).

So,
  why did I go into so much history in a talk meant to deal with today's
  privacy and security threats?
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Re-repeats Itself                                    :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge History repeats itself
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Because history repeats itself.

Today's attempted legal/policy assault on privacy and security are enormous.
We've already covered some.
I don't have time to cover more than a small fraction of them.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Modern Crypto Wars                                :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge ``Going Dark''
#+END_CENTER


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But the big phrase you hear today is "going dark".
Government agencies are fearful of broadening use of encryption
  because they can't read many of those communications.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID ``Going Dark''

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Apple v. FBI
VEP
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Espionage [0/1]
**** DEVOID US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Office of Personnel Management
- DNC
- VEP
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1]
**** DEVOID National Security Letters
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Gag orders
- Prior restraint
- Canaries
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Law [0/1]
**** DEVOID Summary                                          :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- DMCA
  - Risks to security researchers
  - Draconian
- CFAA
#+END_COMMENT


** LACKING Your Fight [0/1]
*** LACKING Headings [0/6]
**** DRAFT Feeding                                           :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
We're feeding into all of this!
#+END_CENTER


**** DEVOID SaaSS and Centralization
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Be sure to mention Cloudbleed and S3
- Who has access to your data?
- The "Cloud"
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING Corporate Negligence
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- Companies balance security and privacy on their balance sheets


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Companies don't care.
They'll balance _costs_ of failure to comply with regulation.
Is it cheaper just to pay up in the event of a data breach?

Governments try, sort of.
They need to catch up with the times.
<<sec regulations>>

<<large-scale breaches>>

(Tie into SaaSS)
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Status Quo
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- Do people care more about privacy and security since the Snowden leaks?
  - (Cite)
- ``I have nothing to hide''
- ``Report anything suspicious''
- Chilling effects


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
You would think after the Snowden revelations that people would be more
  privacy-centric.

Some are.
Many aren't.
There is complacency with the status quo.
Everything is so _convenient_.

"I have nothing to hide."
A common argument.
One that can be notoriously hard to address.

"Report anything suspicious."
(Example of mathematician on plane.)

These all have chilling effects, conscious or not.
<<Wikipedia articles>>
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Status Quo Cannot Hold                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
**The status quo cannot hold.**
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
I hope I've convinced you that the status quo cannot hold.
That even people who aren't that privacy- or security-conscious recognize
  that there are risks not only at a personal level,
  but also national and global.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Push Back                                         :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIn_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{We need to push back}
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{\emph{You} need to push back}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Good crypto; no trust
- Lawmakers: this is not something we can win while we fight with our
  governments.
#+END_COMMENT


** Thank You                                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
Mike Gerwitz

[[mailto:mtg@gnu.org][=mtg@gnu.org=]]

\bigskip

**References Available Online**

[[https://mikegerwitz.com/talks/sapsf]]

\vfill

Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0
International License
#+END_CENTER


** References                                                   :B_appendix:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: appendix
:END:

\printbibliography


* Exporting
You should be able to simply export this buffer as a Beamer presentation
(=C-c C-e l P=) and get a slideshow.

Note that this requires =ox-extras=, which is part of Org Mode's
=contrib/=.  Without it, the =:ignore:= tag will not be recognized and the
rendered slides will have incorrect depth.

* Local Variables
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#                          ("LACKING" . org-warning) \
#                          ("REVIEWED" . "yellow") \
#                          ("AUGMENT" . (:foreground "yellow" :bold t :underline t))
#                          ("READY" . (:inherit org-scheduled :bold t :underline t)))
# eval: (ox-extras-activate '(ignore-headlines))
# End: