Oh, hello
This is a mostly-complete history of the development of my LibrePlanet 2017 talk entitled ``The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom''. I removed timekeeping and miscellaneous notes/outlines, but it's otherwise authentic.master
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#+startup: beamer
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#+TITLE: The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom
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#+AUTHOR: Mike Gerwitz
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#+EMAIL: mtg@gnu.org
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#+DATE: 26 March, LibrePlanet 2017
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#+OPTIONS: H:3 num:nil toc:nil p:nil todo:nil stat:nil
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#+LaTeX_CLASS: beamer
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#+LaTeX_CLASS_OPTIONS: [presentation]
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#+BEAMER_THEME: Warsaw
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#+BEAMER_HEADER: \beamertemplatenavigationsymbolsempty
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#+TODO: RAW(r) LACKING(l) DRAFT(d) REVIEWED(R) | READY(+) REHEARSED(D)
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#+COLUMNS: %25ITEM %10DURATION{:}
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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#+BEGIN: columnview :hlines 1 :id local
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| ITEM | DURATION |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Introduction / Opening | 00:00:30 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Mobile [0/5] | 0:04 |
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| ** Introduction | 0:00 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00:30 |
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| ** Cell Towers [0/2] | 00:01 |
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| *** Fundamentally Needed | |
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| *** Cell-Site Simulators | |
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| ** Wifi [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** Wifi | 00:01 |
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| ** Location Services [0/2] | 00:01 |
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| *** GPS | |
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| *** Access Points | |
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| ** Operating System [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** Untrusted/Proprietary OS | 00:01 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Stationary [0/5] | 0:08 |
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| ** Introduction [0/1] | 0:00 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00:30 |
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| ** Surveillance Cameras [0/2] | 0:00 |
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| *** Unavoidable | |
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| *** Access to Data | 00:00:30 |
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| ** Internet of Things [0/4] | 0:04 |
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| *** Wide Open | 00:00:30 |
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| *** Lack of Security | 00:01:30 |
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| *** Who's Watching? | 00:00:30 |
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| *** Facial Recognition | 00:01 |
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| ** Social Media [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** Collateral Damage | 00:01 |
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| ** Driving [0/3] | 0:02 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00:30 |
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| *** ALPRs | 00:01 |
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| *** Car Itself | 00:00:30 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * The Web [0/6] | 0:12 |
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| ** Introduction [0/1] | |
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| *** Introduction | |
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| ** Bridging the Gap [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** Ultrasound Tracking | 00:01 |
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| ** Incentive to Betray [0/1] | 0:00 |
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| *** Summary | 00:00:30 |
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| ** Analytics [0/2] | 0:02 |
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| *** Trackers | 00:01 |
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| *** Like Buttons | 00:01 |
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| ** Fingerprinting [0/2] | 0:04 |
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| *** Summary | 00:03 |
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| *** Browser Addons | 00:01 |
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| ** Anonymity [0/3] | 0:04 |
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| *** Summary | 00:01 |
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| *** The Tor Network | 00:01 |
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| *** TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix | 00:02 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Data Analytics [0/2] | 0:04 |
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| ** Introduction [0/1] | 0:00 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00 |
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| ** Headings [0/3] | 0:04 |
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| *** Advertisers | 00:02 |
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| *** Social Media | 00:01 |
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| *** Governments | 00:00:30 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Policy and Government [0/6] | 0:12 |
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| ** Introduction [0/1] | 0:00 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00:30 |
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| ** Surveillance [0/4] | 0:06 |
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| *** History of NSA Surveillance | 00:02 |
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| *** Verizon Metadata | 00:00:30 |
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| *** Snowden | 00:01 |
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| *** Tools | 00:02 |
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| ** Crypto Wars [0/3] | 0:03 |
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| *** Introduction | 00:00 |
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| *** Bernstein v. United States | 00:01 |
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| *** Makes Us Less Safe | 00:02 |
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| ** Espionage [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets | 00:01 |
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| ** Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** National Security Letters | 00:01 |
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| ** Law [0/1] | 0:01 |
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| *** Summary | 00:01 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Your Fight [0/1] | 0:05 |
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| ** Headings [0/5] | 0:05 |
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| *** Feeding | 00:00 |
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| *** SaaSS and Centralization | 00:01 |
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| *** Corporate Negligence | 00:01 |
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| *** Status Quo | 00:02 |
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| *** Push Back | 00:01 |
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|------------------------------------+----------|
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| * Local Variabes | |
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#+END
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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*Remember the themes!*:
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- Surreptitious
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- User privacy and security
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- Affects on freedom; chilling effects
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- How free software can help
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The big players seem to be the [[The Web][Web]] and [[Policy and Government][Government]].
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No surprises there.
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It would be a good idea to immediately connect with the audience. So:
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- Most everyone has a mobile device.
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- /This is the most immediate and relatable since it's physically present/
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with them in their travels.
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- Security cameras et. al. during travel.
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So start _briefly_ with the topic of pervasive surveillance?
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- That is what the abstract refers to, after all.
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*Surreptitious*---many audience members won't consider that they're being
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tracked.
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- But by _whom_?
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Maybe a gentle introduction that gets increasingly more alarming and
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invasive topic-wise.
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GOAL: Captivate; Startle
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#+END_COMMENT
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* DRAFT Introduction / Opening :B_fullframe:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:00:30
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:BEAMER_env: fullframe
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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None of you made it here without being tracked in some capacity.
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Some of us are still being tracked at this very moment.
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...
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Let's start with the obvious.
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(Note: You're being "tracked", rather than "watched": the latter is too
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often used and dismissed as tinfoil-hat FUD.)
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#+END_COMMENT
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#+BEGIN_CENTER
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#+BEAMER: \only<1>{You're Being Tracked.}
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#+BEAMER: \only<2>{(No, really, I have references.)}
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#+END_CENTER
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* LACKING Mobile [0/5]
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** DRAFT Introduction :B_ignoreheading:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
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:END:
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*** DRAFT Introduction :B_fullframe:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:00:30
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:BEAMER_env: fullframe
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:END:
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- <1-> Most people carry mobile phones
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- <1-> Synonymous with individual
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- <2> Excellent tracking devices
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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How many of you are carrying a mobile phone right now?
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Probably most of us.
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They are something we carry with us everywhere;
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they are computers that are always on.
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A phone is often synonymous with an individual.
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In other words: they're excellent tracking devices.
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#+END_COMMENT
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** LACKING Cell Towers [0/2]
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:01
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:END:
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*** DRAFT Fundamentally Needed
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- <1-> Phone needs tower to make and receive calls
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- <2-> Gives away approximate location (can triangulate)
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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The primary reason is inherent in a phone's design: cell towers.
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A phone "needs" to be connected to a tower to make and receive calls.
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Unless it is off,
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its connection to the cell tower exposes your approximate location.
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These data persist for as long as the phone companies are willing to persist
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it. If it's mined by the NSA, then it might be persisted indefinitely.
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Some people don't use phones primarily for this reason.
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rms said he might use a phone if it could act as a pager,
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where he'd only need to expose his location once he is in a safe place.
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You can imagine that such would be a very useful and important feature for
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reporters and dissidents as well.
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#+END_COMMENT
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*** LACKING Cell-Site Simulators
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- <1-> Masquerade as cell towers
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- <2-> (List them) e.g. Stingray
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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I'm sure many of you have heard of Cell Site Simulators;
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one of the most popular examples being the Stingray.
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These devices masquerade as cell towers and can perform a dragnet search for
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an individual.
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Your location can be triangulated.
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#+END_COMMENT
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** RAW Wifi [0/1]
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*** RAW Wifi
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:01
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:END:
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||||
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#+BEGIN_COMMENT
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What else is inherent in a modern phone design?
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A common feature is Wifi.
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If you connected to any hidden networks,
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your phone may broadcast that network name to see if it exists.
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Your mobile device could be broadcasting information like past network
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connections and unique device identifiers (MAC),
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which can be used to uniquely identify you.
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Access points increasingly line the streets or are within range in nearby
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buildings.
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Can be incredibly accurate for tracking movements,
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and it is _passive_---it requires no software on your device.
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Disable Wifi when not in use.
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You can also randomize your MAC address,
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and be sure not to broadcast hidden networks.
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#+END_COMMENT
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** RAW Location Services [0/2]
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:01
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:END:
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*** RAW GPS
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Oh, but what if we _do_ have software on the device?
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And we do.
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Let's talk about location services!
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Many people find them to be very convenient.
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The most popular being GPS.
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Because of the cool features it permits,
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it's often enabled.
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And programs will track your movements just for the hell of it.
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Or give an excuse to track you.
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*** RAW Access Points
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But GPS doesn't need to be available.
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Have you ever used a map program on a computer that asked for your location?
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How does it do that without GPS?
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Google scours the planet recording APs.
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It knows based on _what APs are simply near you_ where you are.
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Sometimes this can be more accurate than GPS.
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And it works where GPS and maybe even cell service don't, such as inside
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shopping malls.
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So having radio and GPS off may not help you.
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MAC spoofing won't help since software on your device has countless other
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ways to uniquely identify you---this is active monitoring, unlike previous
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examples.
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** RAW Operating System [0/1]
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*** RAW Untrusted/Proprietary OS
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:01
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:END:
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The OS situation on mobile is lousy.
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Does your phone work for Apple? Google? Microsoft? Blackberry? ...?
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You carry around this computer everywhere you go.
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And you fundamentally cannot trust it.
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I use Replicant.
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Does anyone here use Replicant?
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I feel like I can at least trust my phone a little bit.
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But on nearly every phone,
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the modem still runs proprietary software.
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And often times has direct access to disk and memory.
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So even with Replicant,
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I consider the device compromised;
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I put nothing important on it if I can avoid it.
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* RAW Stationary [0/5]
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** RAW Introduction [0/1] :B_ignoreheading:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
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:END:
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*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:00:30
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:BEAMER_env: fullframe
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:END:
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So let's say you have evaded that type of tracking.
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Maybe you don't carry a phone.
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Or maybe you've mitigated those threats in some way.
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There's certain things that are nearly impossible to avoid.
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** RAW Surveillance Cameras [0/2]
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*** RAW Unavoidable
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On the way here,
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you likely walked by numerous security cameras.
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They could be security cameras for private businesses.
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Traffic cameras.
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Cameras on streets to deter crime.
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Let's set aside local, state, and federal-owned cameras for a moment
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and focus on businesses.
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So a bunch of separate businesses have you on camera.
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So what?
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*** RAW Access to Data
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:00:30
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:END:
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Well one of the most obvious threats, should it pertain to you, is a
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subpoena.
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The best form of privacy is to avoid having the data be collected to begin
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with.
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If law enforcement wanted to track you for whatever reason---crime or
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not!---they could simply subpoena the surrounding area.
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** RAW Internet of Things [0/4]
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*** RAW Wide Open
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:PROPERTIES:
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:DURATION: 00:00:30
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:END:
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||||
In the past, these cameras were "closed-circuit"---
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||||
they were on their own segregated network.
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You'd _have_ to subpoena the owner,
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or otherwise physically take the tape.
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||||
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||||
Today, that might be the intent, but these cameras are often
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||||
connected to the Internet for one reason or another.
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It might be intentional---to view the camera remotely---or it may just be
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||||
how it is set up by default.
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||||
Well...
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Let's expand our pool of cameras a bit.
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||||
Because it's not just businesses that use Internet-connected cameras.
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||||
They're also popular among individuals for personal/home use.
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Home security systems.
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Baby monitors.
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||||
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*** RAW Lack of Security
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||||
:PROPERTIES:
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||||
:DURATION: 00:01:30
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||||
:END:
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||||
Who here has heard of Shodan?
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||||
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||||
Shodan is a search engine for the Internet of Things.
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||||
It spiders for Internet-connected devices and indexes them.
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||||
Okay, that's to be expected.
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||||
Maybe that wouldn't be a problem if people knew proper NAT configuration
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||||
that isn't subverted by UPnP.
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||||
Maybe it wouldn't be a problem if these devices even gave a moment of
|
||||
thought to security.
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||||
|
||||
Anyone heard of Insecam?
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||||
It's a site that aggregates live video feeds of unsecured IP cameras.
|
||||
I can tell you personally that you feel like a scumbag looking at the site.
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||||
There's fascinating things on there.
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||||
And sobering ones.
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||||
And creepy ones.
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||||
Restaurants---families eating dinner; chefs preparing food in the back.
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||||
Public areas---beaches, pools, walkways, city streets.
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||||
Private areas---inside homes; private businesses. Hotel clerks sitting
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||||
behind desks on their cell phones. Warehouses.
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||||
Behind security desks.
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||||
Behind cash registers.
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||||
Hospital rooms.
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||||
Inside surveillance rooms where people watch their surveillance system!
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||||
With armed guards!
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||||
Scientific research: people in full dress performing experiments.
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||||
I saw someone at the dentist getting a teeth cleaning.
|
||||
Anything you can think of.
|
||||
You can literally explore the world.
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||||
There are some beautiful sights! Absolutely gorgeous.
|
||||
They remove things that are too deeply personal.
|
||||
Assuming someone reports it.
|
||||
|
||||
This is an excellent example to demonstrate to others why this is such a big
|
||||
deal.
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Who's Watching?
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
So that's what your average person can do.
|
||||
That's what some of you are going to be doing as soon as you leave this
|
||||
talk, if you haven't started looking already!
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||||
|
||||
That's what law enforcement is going to do.
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||||
That's what the NSA, GHCQ, et. al. are going to do.
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Facial Recognition
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Now let's couple that with facial recognition.
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||||
|
||||
Consider the breadth of devices we just covered.
|
||||
Literally everywhere.
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||||
People don't need to manually look for you anymore;
|
||||
it's automated.
|
||||
Hell, any of us can download a free (as in freedom) library to do facial
|
||||
recognition and train it to recognize people.
|
||||
Facebook famously got creepy by saying it could recognize people by their
|
||||
dress and posture, from behind.
|
||||
|
||||
You don't need facial recognition, though.
|
||||
You can also be identified by your gait.
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||||
|
||||
There's a lot to say about IoT.
|
||||
We'll come back to it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Social Media [0/1]
|
||||
*** RAW Collateral Damage
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
So you don't have any unsecured IoT cameras in your home.
|
||||
Or in this conference.
|
||||
But you do have unsecured people running wild with their photos and their
|
||||
selfies.
|
||||
|
||||
I'm sure you've heard a frequent request/demand from rms:
|
||||
"Don't put pictures of me on Facebook."
|
||||
This applies to all social media, really.
|
||||
I just mentioned facial recognition---
|
||||
this is precisely what Facebook (for example) made it for!
|
||||
To identify people you might know to tag them.
|
||||
It's excellent surveillance.
|
||||
What irks me is when people try to take pictures of my kids,
|
||||
or do and ask if they can put them online.
|
||||
Uh, no. You cannot.
|
||||
And people are sometimes surprised by that refusal.
|
||||
|
||||
Most people are being innocent---
|
||||
they're just trying to capture the moment.
|
||||
What they're actually doing is inflicting collateral damage.
|
||||
If I'm off in the background when you take a picture of your friends in the
|
||||
foreground,
|
||||
I'm still in the photo.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Driving [0/3]
|
||||
*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Okay.
|
||||
So you have no phone.
|
||||
You sneak around public areas like a ninja.
|
||||
Like a vampire, you don't show up in photos.
|
||||
And you have no friends.
|
||||
|
||||
So how else can I physically track you in your travels here?
|
||||
|
||||
Well if you flew here,
|
||||
then your location is obviously known.
|
||||
That's not even worth discussing.
|
||||
|
||||
But what about if you drove?
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW ALPRs
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
ALPRs possibly tracked your movements.
|
||||
Automated License Plate Readers.
|
||||
|
||||
<...>
|
||||
|
||||
Maybe you try to evade them with special license plate covers.
|
||||
If need be, one could just track you by other unique features of your
|
||||
vehicle.
|
||||
And those might not just be law enforcement.
|
||||
|
||||
Security issues extend to this too!
|
||||
<Mention EFF's project>
|
||||
|
||||
You could rent a car.
|
||||
But the rental place probably took your name, license, and other
|
||||
information.
|
||||
You could take a cab and pay with cash.
|
||||
But that can get expensive.
|
||||
And they might have cameras and such anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Car Itself
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Maybe your car itself is a tracking device (e.g. OnStar).
|
||||
|
||||
(Move into Mobile?)
|
||||
|
||||
<...>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* RAW The Web [0/6]
|
||||
** RAW Introduction [0/1] :B_ignoreheading:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
But you're not just tracked in the flesh.
|
||||
Much of what we do today is virtual.
|
||||
What better way to segue than to bridge the two?
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Bridging the Gap [0/1]
|
||||
*** RAW Ultrasound Tracking
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
A challenge for advertisers is correlating users across multiple devices,
|
||||
and in the real world.
|
||||
|
||||
Let's say you saw a commercial for some product Foo on TV.
|
||||
And then you went online to research Foo.
|
||||
And then you bought Foo.
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes commercials have you enter promo codes online to know that you
|
||||
arrived at the site from a TV commercial.
|
||||
Or give you a unique URL.
|
||||
|
||||
Others play inaudible sounds that are picked up by your mobile device or
|
||||
computer.
|
||||
|
||||
<...>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Incentive to Betray [0/1]
|
||||
*** RAW Summary :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
So how does tracking happen?
|
||||
How does this tracking code _get_ on so much of the web?
|
||||
|
||||
Incentives to betray users.
|
||||
|
||||
Many websites make money through advertising.
|
||||
It can be lucrative.
|
||||
And it's _easy_ to do.
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Analytics [0/2]
|
||||
*** RAW Trackers
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
Site analytics is another issue.
|
||||
Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing.
|
||||
That in itself isn't an unreasonable thing broadly speaking,
|
||||
but how you go about it and what types of data you collect
|
||||
defines the issue.
|
||||
|
||||
Take Google Analytics for example.
|
||||
A very popular proprietary analytics service.
|
||||
It is one of the most widely distributed malware programs in the world.
|
||||
|
||||
<<examples of how GA tracks>>
|
||||
|
||||
And all of this is known to Google.
|
||||
All of this can be used to identify users across the entire web.
|
||||
|
||||
<<list others>>
|
||||
|
||||
If you must track your users, consider using Piwik, which you can host
|
||||
yourself.
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Like Buttons
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
Another popular example are "like buttons" and similar little widgets that
|
||||
websites like Facebook offer.
|
||||
If a user is logged into Facebook,
|
||||
then Facebook now knows that they visited that website,
|
||||
_even if they don't click on the button_.
|
||||
|
||||
But even if you don't have a Facebook account,
|
||||
information is being leaked to them
|
||||
you are still being tracked.
|
||||
|
||||
Addons like Privacy Badger will block these.
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Fingerprinting [0/2]
|
||||
*** RAW Summary :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:03
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
These methods are part of a broader topic called "browser fingerprinting".
|
||||
It's just what it sounds like:
|
||||
uniquely identify users online.
|
||||
It's alarmingly effective.
|
||||
|
||||
<<general fingerprinting stuff>>
|
||||
|
||||
<<hardware-fingerprint>>
|
||||
Some methods allow fingerprinting even if the user uses multiple browsers
|
||||
and takes care to clear all session data.
|
||||
They can do this by effectively breaking out of the browser's sandbox by
|
||||
doing operations that depend heavily on specifics of users' hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Browser Addons
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
|
||||
(Merge into other sections?)
|
||||
|
||||
So how do we avoid this type of tracking?
|
||||
|
||||
<<Talk about browser addons>>.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** RAW Anonymity [0/3]
|
||||
*** RAW Summary :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Another way is to be anonymous or pseudononymous.
|
||||
In the latter case,
|
||||
you assume a pseudoynm online and perform only activities that should be
|
||||
associated with that pseudonym.
|
||||
In the former case,
|
||||
there should be no way to ever correlate past or future actions with your
|
||||
current session.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a difficult topic that's pretty dangerous to give advice on if you
|
||||
have strong need for anonymity---for example, if you are a dissident or
|
||||
whistleblower.
|
||||
If your life depends on anonymity,
|
||||
please do your own research.
|
||||
I provide a number of resources to get you started.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW The Tor Network
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Most here have probably heard of Tor.
|
||||
"Tor" stands for "The Onion Router",
|
||||
which describes how it relays data through the Tor network.
|
||||
|
||||
The packet is routed through a number of servers,
|
||||
encrypted with the public key of each server such that the first hop
|
||||
strips off the first layer and so on.
|
||||
The exit node reveals the packet and delivers it to the destination,
|
||||
then begins relaying the reply back to through the network to the user.
|
||||
|
||||
As long as a sufficient portion of the network can be trusted and has not
|
||||
been compromised by an adversary,
|
||||
it isn't possible to trace data back through the network.
|
||||
|
||||
The most common use of Tor is to route web traffic.
|
||||
Many nodes block most other ports.
|
||||
It's also possible to resolve DNS requests through Tor.
|
||||
|
||||
There are lots of other details that I don't have time to get to here,
|
||||
but I provide a number of resources for you.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Tor alone isn't enough to secure your anonymity.
|
||||
|
||||
It's hard to secure a web browser.
|
||||
<links>
|
||||
|
||||
TorBrowser is a hardened version of Firefox.
|
||||
The Tor browser recommends that you don't rely on a vanilla Firefox for
|
||||
anonymity with Tor.
|
||||
|
||||
Tails...
|
||||
|
||||
Whonix...
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* LACKING Data Analytics [0/2]
|
||||
** RAW Introduction [0/1] :B_ignoreheading:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
We've seen adversaries with different motives.
|
||||
Let's explore what some of them do with all those data.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Headings [0/3]
|
||||
*** LACKING Advertisers
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
The biggest threat to privacy to the average user is by companies that
|
||||
aggregate data for the purpose of understanding _you_.
|
||||
Probably better than you understand you.
|
||||
I'm sure many of you heard of the story of Target knowing a girl was
|
||||
pregnant before she did.
|
||||
|
||||
<<user profiles>>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Social Media
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
(Where you are, what you do.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Governments
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
(Segue into government surveillance.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* RAW Policy and Government [0/6]
|
||||
** RAW Introduction [0/1] :B_ignoreheading:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Where to begin.
|
||||
|
||||
Governments have a duty to protect their people.
|
||||
But they also have a duty to know their bounds;
|
||||
to respect citizens' rights and privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
We know how that story goes.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Surveillance [0/4]
|
||||
*** LACKING History of NSA Surveillance
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
(EFF, <<Klein v. NSA>>)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Verizon Metadata
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00:30
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
(Add date)
|
||||
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Snowden
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Tools
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
- XKeyscore and others
|
||||
- Exploits
|
||||
- Hardware
|
||||
- Intercepting shipments
|
||||
- Etc.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Crypto Wars [0/3]
|
||||
*** RAW Introduction :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
All of that happened behind our backs.
|
||||
|
||||
But there is also a war being waged in public.
|
||||
As if we haven't learned from the past.
|
||||
The Crypto wars.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Bernstein v. United States
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
...
|
||||
(Include export-grade crypto)
|
||||
(Code is speech)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** LACKING Makes Us Less Safe
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Apple v. FBI
|
||||
|
||||
- Backdoors
|
||||
- Clipper chip
|
||||
- LOGJAM, etc from export-grade crypto
|
||||
- VEP
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Espionage [0/1]
|
||||
*** LACKING US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
- Office of Personnel Management
|
||||
- DNC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1]
|
||||
*** LACKING National Security Letters
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
- Gag orders
|
||||
- Prior restraint
|
||||
- Canaries
|
||||
|
||||
** LACKING Law [0/1]
|
||||
*** LACKING Summary :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
- DMCA
|
||||
- Risks to security researchers
|
||||
- Draconian
|
||||
- CFAA
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* RAW Your Fight [0/1]
|
||||
** RAW Headings [0/5]
|
||||
*** RAW Feeding :B_fullframe:
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:00
|
||||
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
We're feeding into all of this!
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW SaaSS and Centralization
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
- Be sure to mention Cloudbleed and S3
|
||||
- Who has access to your data?
|
||||
- The "Cloud"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Corporate Negligence
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
Companies don't care.
|
||||
They'll balance _costs_ of failure to comply with regulation.
|
||||
Is it cheaper just to pay up in the event of a data breach?
|
||||
|
||||
Governments try, sort of.
|
||||
They need to catch up with the times.
|
||||
<<sec regulations>>
|
||||
|
||||
<<large-scale breaches>>
|
||||
|
||||
(Tie into SaaSS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Status Quo
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:02
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
You would think after the Snowden revelations that people would be more
|
||||
privacy-centric.
|
||||
|
||||
Some are.
|
||||
Many aren't.
|
||||
There is complacency with the status quo.
|
||||
Everything is so _convenient_.
|
||||
|
||||
"I have nothing to hide."
|
||||
A common argument.
|
||||
One that can be notoriously hard to address.
|
||||
|
||||
"Report anything suspicious."
|
||||
(Example of mathematician on plane.)
|
||||
|
||||
These all have chilling effects, conscious or not.
|
||||
<<Wikipedia articles>>
|
||||
|
||||
I hope I've convinced you that the status quo cannot hold.
|
||||
That even people who aren't that privacy- or security-conscious recognize
|
||||
that there are risks not only at a personal level,
|
||||
but also national and global.
|
||||
|
||||
*** RAW Push Back
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:DURATION: 00:01
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
We need to push back.
|
||||
|
||||
- Good crypto; no trust
|
||||
- Lawmakers: this is not something we can win while we fight with our
|
||||
governments.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* Local Variabes :noexport:
|
||||
Just Emacs configuration stuff.
|
||||
|
||||
# Local Variables:
|
||||
# org-todo-keyword-faces: (("DRAFT" . org-upcoming-deadline) \
|
||||
# ("LACKING" . org-warning) \
|
||||
# ("REVIEWED" . "yellow") \
|
||||
# ("READY" . (:inherit org-scheduled bold :underline t)))
|
||||
# End:
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue