sapsf/slides.org

The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom

Remember the themes!:

• Surreptitious
• User privacy and security
• Affects on freedom; chilling effects
• How free software can help

The big players seem to be the Web and Government. No surprises there.

It would be a good idea to immediately connect with the audience. So:

• Most everyone has a mobile device.

  • This is the most immediate and relatable since it's physically present with them in their travels.
• Security cameras et. al. during travel.

So start briefly with the topic of pervasive surveillance?

• That is what the abstract refers to, after all.

Surreptitious—many audience members won't consider that they're being tracked.

• But by whom?

Maybe a gentle introduction that gets increasingly more alarming and invasive topic-wise.

LaTeX Configuration   export ignore

% citations will be grayed and pushed to the right margin ≤t\origcite\cite % incite = "inline" cite \def\cite{\hfill∈cite} ≠wcommand*{∈cite}[1]{{% \scriptsize \raisebox{1ex}{% \color{gray}% \origcite{#1}% }% }}

\renewcommand*{\bibfont}{\scriptsize}

Slides   export ignore

Introduction / Opening   B_fullframe

Hello, everyone. Thanks for coming!

My name's Mike Gerwitz. I am a free software hacker and activist with a focus on user privacy and security. I'm also a GNU Maintainer, software evaluator, and volunteer for various other duties.

And I'm here to talk to you about an unfortunate, increasingly unavoidable fact of life.

None of you made it here without being tracked in some capacity. Some of us are still being tracked at this very moment!

This isn't a tinfoil hat presentation. It's a survey of facts. Since time isn't on my side here, I'm going to present a broad overview of the most pressing concerns of today, as it relates to everyone here. Every slide has numeric citations, which are associated with references on the final slides. I won't be showing them here—you can get them online. My goal is to present you with enough information that you know that these things exist, and you know where to find more information about them. Those unknown unknowns.

So: let's start with the obvious.

(Note: You're being "tracked", rather than "watched": the latter is too often used and dismissed as tinfoil-hat FUD.)

Mobile [5/5]

Introduction   B_ignoreheading

Introduction   B_fullframe

• <1-> Most people carry mobile phones
• <1-> Synonymous with individual
• <2> Excellent tracking devices

How many of you are carrying a mobile phone right now? Probably most of us. They are something we carry with us everywhere. They are computers that are always on.

A phone is often synonymous with an individual; they are a part of us— we feel incomplete when we're missing our phones. In other words: they're excellent tracking devices.

Cell Towers [6/6]

Fundamentally Needed

Summary

• Phone needs tower to make and receive calls
• Gives away approximate location\cite{pbs:nova:boston}

Tower Image

∈cite{w:file:cell-tower}

The primary reason is inherent in a phone's design: cell towers. A phone "needs" to be connected to a tower to make and receive calls.

Unless it is off or otherwise disconnected (like airplane mode), its connection to the cell tower exposes your approximate location. If the signal reaches a second tower, the potential location can be calculated from the signal delay. More towers, you can also triangulate.

Some people don't use phones primarily for this reason.

rms, for example, said he might use a phone if it could act as a pager, where he'd only need to expose his location once he is in a safe place. You can imagine that such would be a very useful and important feature for reporters and dissidents as well.

Cell-Site Simulators

Summary

• <1-> IMSI-Catchers
• <1-> Masquerade as cell towers
• <1-> Most popular: Stingray
• <2-> Free/libre Android program AIMSICD available on F-Droid attempts to detect\cite{aimsid}

Stingray Image

∈cite{w:file:stingray}

Cell Site Simulators have made a lot of news in the past (including my local news), one of the most popular examples being the Stingray. These devices masquerade as cell towers. This allows (for example) law enforcement to get a suspect's phone to connect to their device rather than a real tower, which allows their location to be triangulated, calls to be intercepted, texts to be mined, etc. Law enforcement might also use it to record all devices in an area, such as during a protest.

The problem is: every phone in the area will try to connect to it; it amounts to a dragnet search, and is therefore extremely controversial.

The Android program AIMSICD—Android IMSI-Catcher Detector—is being developed in an attempt to detect these devices. It is free software and is available on F-Droid.

Verizon Metadata (Order)   B_fullframe

\par∈cite{archive:fisa-verizon}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT Anyone remember this?

This is the first Snowden leak— the secret FISA court order that renewed the FBI Verizon metadata collection program. ``#+END_COMMENT

Ron Wyden   B_fullframe

Senator Ron Wyden, 26 May 2011:

I have served on the Intelligence Committee for over a decade and I wish to deliver a warning this afternoon. When the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted [the business records provision of FISA], they are going to be stunned and they are going to be angry.\cite{eff:jewel:evidence}

Verizon Metadata

<1-> June 2013—Guardian releases leaked document ordering Verizon to collect ``telephony metadata''\cite{guardian:verizon,mtg:uproar}

[…] (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.\cite{archive:fisa-verizon}

<2-> Routing information, source and destination telephone numbers, IMSI and IMEI numbers, and time and duration of the call\cite{archive:fisa-verizon,eff:metadata}

<3-> ``Business records'' provision partly declassified by Clapper on 6 June 2013\cite{dni:business-provs}

<3-> The American people were stunned and angry

June 2013. I remember where I was.

The Guardian newspaper releases a leaked court order, which orders Verizon to collect ``telephony metadata'' on all calls, including domestic.

These matadata include <read above>.

That ``business records'' provision of FISA that Ron Wyden was talking about was partly declassified by the then-DNI James Clapper shortly after that publication.

As Wyden predicted, we were pretty stunned. And pretty pissed off.

Metadata Matters

∈cite{eff:nsa-spying}

EFF on ``Why Metadata Matters'':\cite{eff:metadata} <2-> They know you rang a phone sex service at 2:24 am and spoke for 18 minutes. But they don't know what you talked about. <3-> They know you spoke with an HIV testing service, then your doctor, then your health insurance company in the same hour. But they don't know what was discussed.

There was quite the debate over how much ``metadata'' matters. It matters a lot.

Here's some quotes from an EFF article, as cited.

<Read quotes>

Hm. Metadata.

Wifi [1/1]

ESSID and MAC Broadcast

<1-> Device may broadcast ESSIDs of past hidden networks <1-> Expose unique hardware identifiers (MAC address) <2-> Defending against this is difficult <3-> Turn off Wifi in untrusted places <3-> Turn off settings to auto-connect when receiving e.g. MMS <4-> Use cellular data (e.g. {2,3,4}G) <5-> **MAC address randomization works poorly**\cite{arxiv:mac}

What else is inherent in a modern phone design? A common feature is Wifi.

If you connected to any hidden networks, your phone may broadcast that network name to see if it exists.

It exposes unique device identifiers (MACs), which can be used to identify you.

Defending against this is difficult, unless you take the simple yet effective route: disable Wifi completely, at least when you're not in a safe area you can trust. Some apps will automatically enable networking if they receive, for example, MMS messages; be careful of that. If you really do need data, use your cellular data. You are already hemmoraging information to your phone company, so at least you're limiting your exposure.

Some phones and apps offer MAC address randomization. That's a good thing in priniciple. Unfortunately, it seems to be easily defeated. One study, cited here, claims to be able to defeat randomization 100% of the time, regardless of manufacturer.

Segue to next section: All these previous risks are passive— they require no malicious software on your device. But what if we do have such software? And of course, we do.

Geolocation [3/3]

Global Positioning System (GPS)

∈cite{w:file:gps}

<1-> Not inherently a surveillance tool <2-> Often enabled, and programs abuse it\cite{jots:mobile} <2-> Legitimate: navigation, social media, photos, nearby friends, finding lost phones, location-relative searches, etc. <3-> If phone is compromised, location is known

Let's talk about geolocation! Many people find them to be very convenient. The most popular being GPS.

GPS isn't inherently a surveillance tool; it can't track you on its own. Your GPS device calculates its location based on signals broadcast by GPS satellites in line-of-site.

Because of the cool features it permits, it's often enabled on devices. And programs will track your movements just for the hell of it. Or give an excuse to track you.

I'm not saying there aren't legitimate uses. Navigation systems, social media, photo metadata, finding nearby friends, finding lost phones— all of these things are legitimate. You just need to be able to trust the software that you are running, Often times, you can't.

Even if you can, if your device is owned, they can just enable GPS and your location is known.

But I Want GPS!

<1-> Is the program transparent in what data it sends? (Is the source code available?)\cite{jots:mobile} <1-> 2010: 47 of top 100 Android and iOS apps sent location to devs and third parties\cite{wsj:app-loc} <1-> Ex: Angry Birds sent address book, location, and device ID to third party\cite{networks-of-control} <1-> Does the program let you disable those [anti-]features? <2-> Pre-download location-sensitive data (e.g. street maps) <2-> OsmAnd (free software, Android and iOS)\cite{osmand}

So you may legitimately want GPS enabled. It's terrible that you should be concerned about it.

Are the programs you're using transparent in what they're sending? A precondition to that answer is source code; it's otherwise hard to say if a program is doing other things.

A study by the Wall Street Journal found that 47 of the 100 Android and iOS apps in 2010 shared your location with not only the developers, but also with third parties.

An example is Angry Birds, which for whatever the hell reason was sending users' address books, locations, and device IDs to third parties.

You need to know what data you're leaking so that you can decide whether or not you want to do so. And you need the option to disable it. Or modify the program to disable it.

Sometimes your location is leaked as a side-effect. Navigation systems, for example, usually lazy-load map images. Some apps let you use pre-downloaded maps, like OsmAnd, which is free software available on both Android and—if you must—iOS.

Location Services

<1-> No GPS? No problem! <1-> Mozilla Location Services, OpenMobileNetwork, … \cite{mozilla:loc-services,openmobilenetwork} <2-> Wifi Positioning System; Bluetooth networks; nearby cell towers\cite{w:wps} <2-> Signal strength and SSIDs and MACs of Access Points \cite{w:trilateration,acm:spotfi,acm:lteye} <3-> Some gathered by Google Street View cars <3-> Your device may report back nearby networks to build a more comprehensive database <4-> Works even where GPS and Cell signals cannot penetrate <4-> Can be more accurate than GPS (e.g. what store in a shopping mall)

But GPS doesn't need to be available. Have you ever used a map program on a computer that asked for your location? How does it do that without GPS?

There are numerous services available to geolocate based on nearby access points, bluetooth networks, and cell towers. Based on the signal strength of nearby WiFi networks, your position can be more accurately trangulated.

Some of these data are gathered by Google Street View cars. Devices that have GPS, like your phone might also be reporting back nearby networks in order to improve the quality of these databases.

Sometimes this can be more accurate than GPS. And it works where GPS and maybe even cell service don't, such as inside shopping malls.

So just because GPS is off does not mean your location is unknown.

Operating System [3/3]

Untrusted/Proprietary OS

<1-> Who does your phone work for? Apple? Google? Microsoft? Blackberry? Your manufacturer too? <1-> Carry everywhere you go, but fundamentally cannot trust it\cite{gnu:malware-mobile} <2-> Some come with gratis surveillance <2-> BLU phones sent SMS messages, contacts, call history, IMEIs, and more to third-party servers without users' knowledge or censent \cite{kryptowire:adups}

A lot of this boils down to trust. Who does your phone work for?

Does your phone work for Apple? Google? Microsoft? Blackberry? Or does it work for you?

The OS situation on mobile is lousy. You carry around this computer everywhere you go. And you fundamentally cannot trust it.

Take BLU phones for example—cheap little phones that come with advertising. In November of last year it was discovered that these popular phones contained software that sent SMS messages, contact lists, call history, IMEIs, etc to third-party servers without users' knowledge or consent. That software could also remotely execute code on the device.

Free/Libre Mobile OS?

<1-> Android is supposedly free software <1-> But every phone requires proprietary drivers, or contains proprietary software <2-> Replicant\cite{replicant} <2> Niche. Largely work of one developer now. (Help if you can!)

Android is supposedly a free operating system. Unfortunately, every phone requires proprietary drivers to work, and is loaded with proprietary software.

Does anyone here use Replicant? I do. Replicant is a fully free Android fork. I feel like I can at least trust my phone a little bit, but I still consider any data on it to be essentially compromised in the sense that I can't be confident in my ability to audit it and properly secure the device.

Modem Isolation

But modem still runs non-free software\cite{replicant:sec} Sometimes has access to CPU, disk, and memory\cite{replicant:samsung-bd}

But on nearly every phone, the modem still runs proprietary software. And sometimes it has direct access to CPU, disk, and memory. Replicant closed a backdoor in Samsung Galaxy phones that allowed for remote access to the disk. That backdoor might not have been intentional, but it illustrates the possibility, and could still be exploited by an attacker.

So even with Replicant, I consider the device compromised; I put nothing important on it if I can avoid it.

Vehicles

Introduction   B_fullframe

\Huge What about your car?

Okay, how about something else that's mobile: your car.

OnStar   B_fullframe

\smallskip

∈cite{onstar:privacy-policy}

Since 2011, retains all GPS and system data to sell to third parties

I vowed never to get a modern vehicle. Turns out, I can't afford the maintenance on older ones, and safety of my children is pretty important. I got a decent lease deal on a Chevy.

What have Chevys come with for the past 20 years? OnStar.

The first thing I did when I got home with the car was get out the manual, find that it had its own dedicated fuse, and pulled it.

How much could it possibly track? Well, here's the relevant portion of the OnStar privacy policy.

Let alone security…we'll cover that in a little bit.

Ford   B_fullframe

``We know everyone who breaks the law, we know when you're doing it. We have GPS in your car, so we know what you're doing. By the way, we don't supply that data to anyone.''\cite{binsider:ford-gps}

\hfill—Jim Farley, VP/Marketing and Sales, 2014

And then you have stupid executives saying crap like this:

<Read quote>

Oh, excellent! I'm assured.

It's a problem that VPs don't think this is a problem and will just say it off the cuff.

Stationary [5/5]

Introduction [1/1]   B_ignoreheading

Introduction   B_fullframe

\large ``If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear.''\cite{rosen:naked,solove:nothing-to-hide,metro:goebbels}

Well, speaking of stupid quotes!

So let's say you have evaded that type of tracking. Maybe you don't carry a phone. You don't drive or you drive a car instead of a computer. Or maybe you've mitigated those threats in some way.

There's certain things that are nearly impossible to avoid.

This quote. We'll get back to it.

Surveillance Cameras (CCTV) [5/5]

Unavoidable Surveillance

Certain types of tracking are unavoidable Security cameras are everywhere \cite{intercept:nyc-surveil,cbs:sf-smile,fast:das} Businesses Traffic Streets/sidewalks Public transportation

On the way here, you likely walked by numerous security cameras. They could be security cameras for private businesses. Traffic cameras. Cameras on streets to deter crime.

Private Cameras in Plain View; Tinerloin, SF

∈cite{cbs:sf-smile}

``The idea that you can sort of meet in a public place and quietly have a conversation that we’re sort of accustomed to from spy movies, that is really not realistic anymore,'' —Nadia Kayyali, EFF\cite{cbs:sf-smile}

This is a map of private surveillance cameras in plain view around SF's Tenderloin neighborhood. Obviously your city or town might be different. Could be worse, even. And these are just the ones that the DA's office found in plain view!

According to them, people who live in this neighborhood could be on camera dozens of times in a single day.

Alright, so a bunch of private entities have you on camera; So what?

Access to Data

<1-> Data can be obtained with a warrant or subpoena <2-> Data can be compromised <3-> Chilling effect <4-> If you own a surveillance system, be responsible and considerate <4-> Best way to restrict data is to avoid collecting it to begin with

Well one of the most obvious threats, should it pertain to you, is a warrant or subpoena.

Most of us aren't going to have to worry about a crime. But data can be compromised. And it isn't possible for you to audit it; you have no idea who has you on camera.

This creates a chilling effect. You're going to act differently in public knowing that someone might be watching, or could be watching later on if recorded.

If you have a surveillance system, or any sort of public-facing cameras, please be considerate. If you only care who is on your property, don't record the sidewalk in front of your house. Or at least restrict motion detection to your property. The best form of privacy is to avoid having the data be collected to begin with.

Domain Awareness System (Intro)   B_fullframe

\only<1>{What if all those cameras—including private—were connected?} \only<2>{\Huge NYPD\par Domain Awareness System∈cite{nyc:pspg}} \only<3>{

\large Although NYPD documents indicate that the system is specifically designed for anti-terrorism operations, any incidental data it collects ``for a legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose'' by DAS can be utilized by the police department.\cite{fast:das}

…but what if law enforcement didn't have to go door-to-door?

Let's talk about the NYPD's Domain Awareness System.

It was designed in part from the usual unjustifiable and irrational response to terrorism threats after 9/11. But any data this system collects for ``legtimate'' law enforcement or public safety purposes can be used against you.

Domain Awareness System

<1-> Partnership between the NYPD and Microsoft at a cost of $230M in\nbsp{}2013\cite{reuters:nypd-das,nyc:pspg} <1-> Surveillance cameras, license plate readers, radiation detectors, 911\nbsp{}system, criminal records, \ldots <2-> \gt 6,000 surveillance cameras, $2\over 3$ private businesses\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston} <3-> Database of over 16 million plates, every car going into Lower Manhatten\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston} <4-> Can search in seconds for terms like ``red baseball cap''\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston} <4-> Detects ``suspicious behaviors'' like unattended bags and circling cars\cite{reuters:nypd-das,pbs:nova:boston}

The Domain Awareness System is a partnership between Microsoft and the NYPD. It's mammoth. It's pretty amazing—it's like science fiction. But I care about privacy, so instead I'm going to use adjectives like ``Orwellian'' and ``Kafkaesque''.

It contains over six thousand security cameras, over two-thirds of which are private closed-circuit cameras. It includes license plate readers that record everyone going into Lower Manhattan, along with a database of over sixteen million license plates. It can search in seconds for very specific terms, like ``red baseball cap'', and it can monitor for suspicious behaviors, like unattended bags, or cars circling an area. If it finds an unattended bag, you can rewind to find who left it.

A lot of us are programmers— think about the realtime analysis of all of these frames. It really is a fascinating field to work in. But there's serious ethical concerns with how it's applied.

This thing also integrates the 911 system, radiation detectors, criminal records, etc.

This is the direction we're heading in— these things will only spread. In fact, the NYPD will get a 30% cut when Microsoft sells it to others.

Driver Surveillance [3/3]

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

Images

\par∈cite{eff:alpr}

\par∈cite{eff:alpr}

\par∈cite{aclu:tracked}

Summary

Scan passing cars' license plates\cite{aclu:tracked,eff:alpr} Produce alphanumeric representation with timestamp and photograph

I want to talk about a couple issues related to driver surveillance. These things are a widespread, nasty threat to privacy, and they don't need a sophisticated Domain Awareness System to deploy.

The first are ALPRs. ALPRs are mounted on police cars and objects like light poles. They scan passing cars' license plates, convert them to alphanumeric data, record the time and date, and possibly an image of the vehcile. Here's a screenshot of the interface of one; we'll get into how exactly we got that in a bit. The ACLU has an excellent report on it, and the EFF has a campaign against it; see those two resources for more info.

Automatic Toll Readers

<1-> Electronic toll booth using RFIDs or ALPRs\cite{eff:golden-gate-toll} <1-> In the North-East we have E-ZPass (RFID)\cite{w:ezpass} <1-> Golden Gate Bridge requires FasTrack or plate-based <2-> But they provide an option for an anonymous FasTrack account using cash\cite{goldengate:anon} <2-> (Granted, you're still captured by an ALPR) <3-> Routinely used by law enforcement\cite{baynews:fastack-data} <4-> They're not very secure, either\cite{blackhat:toll-systems,register:rfid-clone}

The other is automatic toll readers.

Electronic toll booths are replacing traditional cash-based tolls. Some places require it, like the Golden Gate Bridge. I was unsettled when I heard my county discussing it. One option is windshield-mounted RFIDs. In the North-East, we have E-ZPass. For the Golden Gate Bridge, FasTrack.

We've already seen that law enforcement uses these data, but in the case of FasTrack, data are even used in civil suits like divorces.

And they have their security issues; many can be easily cloned, for example.

Akin To GPS Tracking

United States v. Jones: GPS tracking constitutes search under Fourth Amendment\cite{w:us-v-jones}

How is pervasive surveillance different if it achieves essentially the same result?

In the US Supreme Court case United States v. Jones, the judges unanimously ruled that GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Many wonder how tracking as I just described is any different. If you have ALPRs and other surveillance systems throughout the same area within which a warrant for GPS tracking can be executed, you would get similar results. With much less risk, too—no secret device that may be discovered.

That's for a court to eventually decide. But it's a useful comparison against precedent.

Internet of Things [13/13]

Internet-Connected Cameras   B_fullframe

\Huge

In the past, these cameras were on their own segregated networks. You'd have to subpoena the owner or get a warrant, or otherwise physically take the tape.

Today…that might be the intent, but these cameras are often connected to the Internet for one reason or another. It might be intentional—to view the camera remotely or on a device—or it may just be how the camera is set up by default.

Well… It's not just businesses that use Internet-connected cameras. They're also popular among individuals for personal/home use so that they can view them on their smart phones and elsewhere. Like home security systems. Baby monitors.

The ``S'' In IoT Stands For ``Security''

<1-> Shodan—IoT search engine\cite{shodan} <2-> You'll also find other things. Secure your databases. \cite{krebs:mongodb} <2-> Can search for specific devices <2-> If you are vulnerable, someone will find you <3-> Top voted search was ``Webcam'' when I was writing this slide

Who here has heard of Shodan?

Shodan is a search engine for the Internet of Things. It spiders for Internet-connected devices and indexes them. Okay, that's to be expected. Maybe that wouldn't be a problem if NAT configuration weren't subverted by UPnP. Or maybe it wouldn't be a problem if these devices even gave a moment of thought to security.

It also indexes other interesting things. For example, it was used to find unsecured MongoDB instances so that the attackers could hold data for ransom.

So people can find your stuff. If an attacker knows that some device is vulnerable, Shodan can be used to search for that device.

At the time I was writing this, the top voted search under "Explore" was "Webcam". Followed by "Cams", "Netcam", and "default password".

Who's Watching?

Screenshot

\par∈cite{insecam}

Summary

Insecam is a directory of Internet-connected surveillance cameras\cite{insecam} Live video feeds (browser connects directly to cameras)

But Shodan isn't the only thing out there. Anyone heard of Insecam?

It's a site that aggregates live video feeds of unsecured IP cameras. Your browser connects directly to the cameras— literally, they are wide open; nothing fancy is going on here. I can tell you personally that you feel like a scumbag looking at the site.

Insecam Example 1   B_fullframe

Here are some examples. I blurred any identifying features for privacy.

We have surveillance rooms where people watch their surveillance system! Inception-kinda thing going on here. Also doesn't help that they are watching the TV on the wall too.

There's many public swimming pools.

Elevators are awkward enough to begin with. How about someone watching you in such a vulnerable space?

We have a photolithography lab in my home city. I have no idea which one, or where exactly.

These are creepy. Somewhat cool, even. Let's get a little more personal.

Example 2   B_fullframe

How about inside hospital rooms? This patient has an ice pack strapped to the side of her face. I'm pretty sure this feed was outside of the United States; I can't imagine that this type of thing would make it past HIPAA audits.

How about inside someone's home? This looks to be a bedroom. There is a family photo on the wall. Oh yeah.

I saw someone at the dentist getting a teeth cleaning. I didn't copy that photo at the time, and I can't find it now, fortunately.

This is an excellent example to demonstrate to others why this is such a big deal. This should make anyone feel uncomfortable.

Especially those home cameras. I wish I knew whose camera that was, so that they could be notified. These people are unaware. And these manufactuers set them up for this.

Even if you can't find a camera on this site, Shodan might have indexed it; just connect.

Smart TVs (Samsung Privacy Policy)   B_fullframe

``Please be aware that if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third party through your use of Voice Recognition.''

\hfill—Samsung SmartTV Privacy Policy, 2015

\cite{eff:samsung-tv-policy}

So while we're on the topic of being in someone's home…

Samsung's SmartTV privacy policy caused a big fuss a couple years ago by blatantly stating that your personal conversations will be sent to third-party servers for voice recognition.

It was compared to George Orwell's telescreens.

<Read above>

Smart TVs (Weeping Angel)   B_fullframe

Wikileaks

Title

\par∈cite{vault7:weeping,vault7:y0}

Suppress LEDs for ``fake off'' Record audio Remote shell and file transfer Extract WiFi credentials ``TODO'': Record video

But it might not be Samsung that's listening.

Recently, Wikileaks released what it refers to as ``Vault 7'', an unprecedented doxxing of the CIA.

Weeping Angel was one of the projects. It targets Samsung Smart TVs and can suppress LEDs to enter what they call a ``fake off'' mode, covertly listening to the environment. As of their 2014 notes, video surveillance was explicitly on their TODO list. I find it unlikely that they didn't succeed given that they appear to have root access to the device.

CIA

If Samsung isn't listening, then others might be.

Smart TV Ransomware (LG)

∈cite{bleep:lgtv-ransom}

Remember: if the CIA exploited a vulnerability, it's very possible that other adversaires have as well; it isn't just the CIA you have to worry about.

This is an LG Smart TV owned by Android ransomware.

Amazon Echo—Always Listening

Echo echo echo echo…

∈cite{w:file:echo}

Summary

Voice recognition on Amazon's servers; have recordings \cite{engadget:murder-echo,guardian:murder-echo} Warrant issued in murder case for recordings \cite{engadget:murder-echo,guardian:murder-echo} Always listening; ``wake word'' doesn't matter (they control the software; device can be compromised)\cite{gizmodo:echo-wiretap} <2-> Should do voice recognition on the device <2-> Run free software <2-> Connect to your own server for actions <2-> Hardware switch for microphone

Personal assistants have become pretty popular. Amazon Echo is one of those ``always-listening'' devices that can do your bidding. But since it performs voice recognition on Amazon's servers, they have access to recordings of your data. A court has issued a warrant for those recordings in a murder case in December of this past year.

Look: a device like this—one that is always listening— is a security nightmare. It doesn't matter if it has some sort of ``wake word''; functionality can be hidden from you or changed with an update. You do not have control over that device or the software that it is running. If an attacker owns the device, they're sitting there in your living room. A device like this needs to do voice recognition locally, run free software, connect to a server of your choosing for actions. and have a hardware switch for the microphone.

Consder the Benign

Water meter used in murder case as evidence\cite{guardian:murder-echo} 140 gallons between 1AM and 3AM in Winter? Thermostat? Usage patterns could hint at when you're home Window/door sensors?

Consider what devices in your home might have access to.

That murder case I just mentioned with the Echo— they also gathered data from the water meter which showed that the suspect used 140 gallons between 1AM and 3AM. During Winter, nonetheless.

Your thermostat could reveal usage patterns to determine remotely when you might be home. There are door and window sensors.

Creepy-Ass Children's Toys?

???

∈cite{guardian:doll-spy}

What about creepy-ass children's toys? I took a screenshot of this Guardian article because… A couple years ago you'd only find a headline like this in something like The Onion.

``German watchdog classifies My Friend Cayla doll as `illegal espionage apparatus'.''

What the hell.

ALPRs Wide Open

∈cite{eff:alpr}

John Matherly (Shodon author) noticed many web-accessible PIPS control panels Other researcher found some accessible via telnet\cite{darius:alpr-telnet}

Alright, well, stupid things happen outside the home too. Those ALPRs we just talked about.

Turns out that they have web interfaces. John Matherly, the author of Shodon, found a number of control panels for PIPS ALPRs. Another researcher found telnet access on some. In both cases, license plate data could be extracted, and the system could be reconfigured.

Biometrics

<1-> Humans no longer need to scour video feeds\cite{eff:facial-tech,churchix,facefirst,pbs:nova:boston} <1-> Facial recognition widely used, even for mobile  apps\cite{register:fb-scan,eff:ios-photo-diff,eff:fbi-bio} <2-> NYPD has a gallery of over 4M individuals\cite{pbs:nova:boston} <2-> Quality can be low and pixelated; various machine learning algorithms\cite{pbs:nova:boston,wired:pixel-face,arxiv:google-pixel-res} <3-> No face? Check your gait.\cite{ieee:gait,ijca:gait} <4-> No gait? Well\ldots whatever, just ask Facebook.\cite{newsci:fb-noface} <5-> Even fingerprints and iris from high-resolutions photos\cite{bio:iris}

Now let's couple that with facial recognition.

Consider the breadth of devices we just covered. Literally everywhere. People don't need to manually look for you anymore; it's automated. Hell, any of us can download a free (as in freedom) library to do facial recognition and train it to recognize people. It doesn't even have to be clear— there's machine learning algorithms to reconstruct pixelated faces with somewhat decent accuracy to be useful. The NYPD has over 4 million people's images in a database that they compare against during facial recognition.

Don't have a face? You can also be identified by your gait. No gait? Facebook famously got even creepier by saying it could recognize people by their dress, posture, and hair, without even seeing their face.

Your fingerprints and iris data can even be extracted from high-resolution photos; a cracker used such a method to defeat Apple's TouchID by making a mould.

There's a lot more to say about IoT. We'll come back to it.

Social Media [1/1]

Collateral Damage

<1-> Please don't put pictures of me on Facebook\cite{rms:facebook} <1-> Don't put pictures of my children _anywhere_\cite{techcrunch:fb-baby} <2-> That person in the distance is collateral damage\cite{register:fb-scan,guardian:fb-scan,pbs:nova:boston}

So you don't have any unsecured IoT cameras in your home. Or in this conference. But you do have unsecured people running wild with their photos and their selfies.

I'm sure you've heard a frequent request/demand from rms: "Don't put pictures of me on Facebook." It's excellent surveillance. What irks me is when people try to take pictures of my kids, or do and ask if they can put them online. Uh, no. You cannot. And people are sometimes surprised by that refusal.

Most people are being innocent— they're just trying to capture the moment. What they're actually doing is inflicting collateral damage. If I'm off in the background when you take a picture of your friends in the foreground, I'm still in the photo. Just something to consider when taking photos of others..

The Web [7/7]

Introduction [1/1]   B_ignoreheading

Introduction   B_fullframe

\Huge Fleshy You $\Longleftrightarrow$ Virtual You

But you're not just tracked in the flesh. Much of what we do today is virtual. So, naturally, there are those that want to bridge them.

There's a lot of research and methods to achieve this; we're only going to explore one of the most startling ones.

Bridging the Gap [3/3]

FTC: They're Watching You   B_fullframe

\par∈cite{ftc:silver}

This is a sample letter template from the FTC. It states: <read paragraph>. A challenge for advertisers is correlating users across multiple devices, and in the real world.

Let's say you saw a commercial for some product Foo on TV. And then you went online to research Foo. And then you bought Foo.

Sometimes commercials have you enter promo codes online to know that you arrived at the site from a TV commercial. Or give you a unique URL.

Ultrasound Tracking

⋯ $\Longleftrightarrow$ TV $\Longleftrightarrow$ Retail Store $\Longleftrightarrow$ Mobile $\Longleftrightarrow$ Web $\Longleftrightarrow$ ⋯

Correlates users across devices; airgap bridge\cite{ubeacsec:paper,wired:ultrasonic} Inaudible to humans Could deanonymize (e.g. Tor users)\cite{33c3:talk-behind,bleep:ultrasound-tor}

``Silverpush could generate a detailed log of the television content viewed while a user’s mobile phone was turned on.''\cite{ftc:silver}

Others play inaudible sounds that are picked up by your mobile device or computer.

This has other serious implications. There are concerns, for example, about this method being able to be used to deanonymize Tor users.

In that letter, FTC mentions Silverpush by name. There are other companies too; see the references.

Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking (uXDT)

<1-> Termed ``Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking'' (uXDT)\cite{bleep:ultrasound-tor,ftc:xdt} <1-> Mitigations? <2-> SilverDog is a Chromium addon to filter HTML5 audio\cite{ubeacsec:paper} <3-> Don't install software that keep secrets (proprietary) <3-> Don't run untrusted code on websites (use e.g. NoScript)\cite{mtg:rof} <4-> Turn off your device when not in use <4-> Keep device away from other media

This is termed ``Ultrasound Cross-Device Tracking'', or simply ``Cross-Device Tracking''. How do you go about mitigating this type of threat?

Well, researchers studying this issue wrote SilverDog, a Chromium addon to filter HTML5 audio to remove ultrasonic frequencies. That doesn't help with TorBrowser, though, which is FF-based. The reserachers also propose a change to the Android permission system for audio.

This type of thing only works when you're keeping some serious secrets. That's easy to do with proprietary software. Much riskier to do (but not impossible) with free software. For websites, don't run untrusted JavaScript code; block it with an addon like NoScript. We'll get into that in a little bit.

You can also turn off the device when not in use, and maybe keep it away from other media. This is far from the only mobile threat; you may want to take precautions for other things anyway.

Analytics [4/4]

Introduction   B_fullframe

\only<1-3>{ {\Huge Data Analytics}

\uncover<2-3>{\LARGE (Building User Profiles)}

\uncover<3>{\large (Tracking)} }

\only<4->{ {\Huge Spyware}

\uncover<5>{\LARGE (With Science)} }

This all leads into a larger subject called ``data analytics''.

Which is really just building, analyzing, and aggregating user profiles.

Which is generally called tracking.

…which we usually just call spyware. But this has science!

Trackers

<1-> Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing <1-> That in itself isn't an unreasonable concept <2-> Methods and data define the issue

Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing. That in itself isn't an unreasonable thing, broadly speaking, but how you go about it and what types of data you collect defines the issue.

Google Analytics

GA Dashboard

∈cite{google:ga:features}

∈cite{w3techs:analytics}

Description

<1-> User location, screen resolution, time on page, heatmap, etc\cite{w:behavioral-targeting} <1-> Unique identifier assigned <1-> Fine-grained reporting for site owner <2-> Knows many sites user visited across Web\cite{w3techs:google}

Take Google Analytics for example. It is one of the most widely distributed spyware programs in the world.

It collects a variety of user data. A lot of it really is what website owners want to know: geography, screen resolution, time on the page, heatmaps, etc. Except…

All of this is known to Google. And because services like GA, AdWords, etc are so widely used, all of this can be used to identify users across the entire web.

Piwik

Dashboard

∈cite{piwik}

Description

<2-> Data on **your own servers**\cite{mtg:gitlab-piwik} <2-> Visitor privacy settings\cite{piwik:privacy} <2-> Privacy as a site owner

If you must track your users, consider using Piwik, which you can host yourself. This means that your visitor data aren't stored and accessible by Google or other companies. Pwik has some user privacy settings to anonymize, remove logs, respect DNT, provide opt-out, etc. It also gives website owners some privacy by not leaking paths and other information about the website:

Social Networking

Like Buttons

∈cite{w:fb-like-img}

<2-> Infecting the Web with trackers under guise of community\cite{pnas:predict,w:behavioral-targeting,uld:fb} <2-> Tracks regardless of whether you are logged in to Facebook \cite{bloomberg:belgum-fb,roosendaal:fb-like,networks-of-control}

Another popular example are "like buttons" and similar little widgets that websites like Facebook offer. It might help get the word out about your stuff, but please don't fall into the trap of betraying your visitors. Please don't fall into the trap of clicking it, either— it's easy to infer a great deal of information about you from what you "like".

If a user is logged into Facebook, then Facebook now knows that they visited that website, even if they don't click on the button.

But even if you don't have a Facebook account, you are still being tracked.

Fingerprinting [3/3]

Summary   B_fullframe

\Huge Fingerprinting

These methods are part of a broader topic called ``fingerprinting''. It's just what it sounds like: uniquely identify users online.

EFF Research   B_fullframe

EFF Research, 2010:\cite{eff:browser-uniqueness-blog,eff:browser-uniqueness}

``In our analysis of anonymized data from around half a million distinct browsers, 84% had unique configurations. Among browsers that had Flash or Java installed, 94% were unique, and only 1% had fingerprints that were seen more than twice.''

That was seven years ago.

You're really screwed today.*

∈cite{eff:panopti2,eff:browser-uniqueness,mozilla:fingerprinting,% chromium:identification,tor:browser-design,stanford:private-browsing,% norte:tor-fingerprint,browserleaks,ars:fingerprint,hardware-fingerprint}

Back in 2010, the EFF released a paper with results from their fingerprinting research project Panopticlick. Back then, they had an 84% success rate; even higher with Flash and Java.

But we ain't in 2010 anymore. We have options. Very creative ones.

Alarmingly Effective

Panopticlick (EFF)\cite{panopti:about} User Agent, cookies, screen resolution, fonts, language, session storage, canvas, WebGL, ad blocker, audio, keystrokes, mouse movement, \ldots\cite{ijcseit:biometric} Can even track separate browsers on the same hardware\cite{hardware-fingerprint,ars:fingerprint}

Fingerprinting is alarmingly effective. We don't have time to get into much detail on how it works; I provided plenty of resources for that. But there are some interesting ones.

We don't just have to rely on basic browser-provied information like user agent, fonts, and cookies anymore. How about tracking how the user moves her mouse and scrolls? What about keystroke analysis? Random noise from audio? Time of CPU-intensive tasks like rendering 3D elements?

Some of these methods are hardware-based. They can fingerprint even if the user opens a different browser, or maybe even a different operating system, on the same box.

Some are behavioral. Keystroke patterns will persist wherever the user goes.

We'll get into some defenses in a bit.

Incentive to Betray [2/2]

Summary   B_fullframe

<1-> There is strong incentive to betray <2> Money (advertising) <2> Attention & praise <2> ``Business intelligence''

So how does tracking happen? How does this tracking code get on so much of the web?

Incentives to betray users.

Many websites make money through advertising. It can be lucrative. And it's easy to do.

Others get addicted to attention and praise.

Others simply want to know what their visitors are doing on their website.

Most website owners don't think or know about these issues. They're unknowing pawns in the Web of surveillance.

Web of Surveillance   B_fullframe

∈cite{moz:lightbeam}

(After mitigations)

And I do mean a Web of surveillance.

This is LightBeam. It's an addon for Firefox that graphs first- and third-party sites that you visit, providing you with a visualization of the Web that's hidden from most users. I created a new FF profile and installed the addon; none of my privacy settings or other addons I'm used to. You can see at the top that I visited five websites: Washington Post, NY Times from Google, Guardian, and—which you can't see here because they're actually disjoint from this graph—The Intercept. Good for them! And yet, it hit 86 third party sites! NYT alone connected to 47 different third parties!

I was blown away.

Some of these are trackers. Some of them are remotely hosted scripts and fonts and media.

So let me show you what I'm used to seeing. This is what happens when I try to mitigate some of these threats.

Mitigations & Anonymity [8/8]

Summary   B_fullframe

\Huge How Do We Mitigate?

So how do we do that?

Well, it depends on your threat model, but let's start with the easy stuff.

Disable the Damn JavaScript!

<2-3> Preempt most sophisticated and damning fingerprinting methods <2-3> Stop hardware profiling <2-3> Stop keystroke/mouse analysis\cite{ijcseit:biometric} <3> Remember those audio beacons?\cite{bleep:ultrasound-tor}

<4-> Running arbitrary untrusted, unsigned, ephemeral code (also from many third parties)\cite{mtg:rof} <4-> Restore Online Freedom! (My LibrePlanet 2016 talk) <5-> LibreJS blocks non-free, but free doesn't mean free of malice

NoScript blocks JavaScript based on URL patterns\cite{noscript} Warning: Allows some sites by default! Also blocks media and fonts; provides XSS and clickjacking prevention

Okay, I can't say this enough. Disable the damn JavaScript! The Web isn't broken without it, they're breaking the web with it! I write a lot of JavaScript for a living. My GNU project is ease.js, which is a JavaScript library. And yet, I only allow JavaScript to execute on a few websites!. Even on most websites I trust, I don't. Some people run LibreJS, and I support that project. But note that free software doesn't mean free of malice; LibreJS solves a different problem than the one I'm describing— when you do allow JS to run, it should be free.

It's probably obvious from the logo that I'm talking about the NoScript addon. It does more than just block JS— it also blocks media, custom fonts, protects against certain types of XSS and clickjacking attacks, and more. If you don't know those are, that's okay.

LightBeam NoScript   B_fullframe

(Before NoScript)

(After NoScript with no whitelist)

So this is our graph again before NoScript.

And here it is after running NoScript with no whitelist. Without any other mitigations.

Obviously results will vary depending on the website.

We're going to get back to JS soon.

Block Ads and Trackers

Privacy Badger blocks trackers\cite{eff:privacy-badger,lp:2016:privacy-badger} uBlock_0 filters (primarily) ads\cite{gh:ublock-origin} Self-Destructing Cookies clears cookies and LocalStorage\cite{moz:sd-cookies}

The issue surrounding Ad Blockers is framed such that we're waging war against advertisers. No—they're waging war against us.

You'll find that the bulk of what these addons handle is related to ad networks. Privacy Badger works to block sites that appear to be tracking you. Cooper Quintin—developer of Privacy Badger—gave a great talk last year here at LP; go check it out. uBlock Origin describes itself as a ``wide-spectrum blocker'', but it serves primarily as an ad blocker. Self-Destructing cookies clears out a site's cookies and LocalStorage once a tab is closed. There may be better options out there; this seems to be useful for me.

I don't have time to go into technical details, unfortunately.

Anonymity   B_fullframe

\bigskip Origin is unknown to server; no unique identifier known by server∈cite{whonix:donot}

\bigskip Origin is unknown to server; unique identifier is available to server∈cite{whonix:donot}

Another way is to be anonymous or pseudononymous. In the latter case, you assume a pseudoynm online and perform only activities that should be associated with that pseudonym. In the former case, there should be no way to ever correlate past or future actions with your current session.

IANAAE   B_fullframe

(I Am Not An Anonymity Expert)

This is a difficult topic that's pretty dangerous to give advice on if you have strong need for anonymity—for example, if you are a dissident or whistleblower. If your life depends on anonymity, please do your own research. I provide a number of resources to get you started.

The Tor Network

∈cite{tor:overview}

<1> The Onion Router (Tor)\cite{tor} <1> Helps defend against traffic analysis

Most here have probably heard of Tor. Its purpose is to protect against certain kinds of traffic analysis.

"Tor" stands for "The Onion Router", which describes how it relays data through the Tor network.

The packet is routed through a number of servers, encrypted with the public key of each server such that the first hop strips off the first layer and so on, like an onion. The exit node reveals the packet and delivers it to the destination, then begins relaying the reply back to through the network to the requesting user.

As long as a sufficient portion of the network can be trusted and has not been compromised by an adversary, it should not be possible to figure out that path.

The most common use of Tor is to route web traffic.

There are lots of other details that I don't have time to get to here, but I provide a number of resources for you.

TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix

Also need to change browsing habits\cite{whonix:donot}

Browser needs to be hardened Remember: browser leaks a lot of data\cite{panopti:about,eff:browser-uniqueness} TorBrowser is a hardened Firefox derivative\cite{tor:browser,tor:browser-design}

<3-> Operating System needs to be hardened <3-> Tails—The Amnesic Incognito Live System\cite{tor:tails} <4> Whonix—Multi-layer isolation in VMs\cite{whonix}

But Tor alone isn't enough to secure your anonymity. You also have to change your browsing habits. That is difficult and nuanced advice to give, let alone in a mention in a talk, so I defer to my citations.

For some people, that's enough. If your threat model involves only advertisers and other snoopers, you might be okay with Tor and privacy extensions. For nearly all of my Web traffic, that's what I care about.

But if you're a dissident, and your life is in danger, you have more work to do. If you are worried about government surveillance or cracking, you have more work to do.

It's hard to secure a web browser.

TorBrowser is a hardened version of Firefox. The Tor browser recommends that you don't rely on a vanilla Firefox for anonymity with Tor.

The operating system needs hardening. There are two major options. The first one is Tails: The Amnesic Incognito Live System. It is an ephemeral OS that you can simply boot from USB on any PC. It routes all traffic through the Tor network.

The second is Whonix. It is not ephemeral: it requires a host OS (or hypervisor) and runs two VMs: one is the guest that the user uses as a desktop, and the other is the VM it routes all traffic through, which goes through Tor. If the guest the user is using is compromised, an attacker cannot subvert the Tor network.

There's obvious tradeoffs there for both; I encourage you to look into both before deciding which is best for your threat model.

Data and Profiling [4/4]

Introduction   B_ignoreheading

Introduction   B_fullframe

\Huge ``Big Data''

(Your Big Data)

\Huge ``Business Intelligence''

We've seen adversaries with different motives. Let's explore what some of them do with all those data.

This is a ``big data'' problem. You might also hear this called ``business intelligence''.

Those Who Spy

Data Brokers

Lightbeam Reminder

Summary

Ghostery lists *over 3,000 companies receiving web/app data*\cite{ghostery:companies}

Back to that Lightbeam graph of third parties. Ghostery has a list of third parties receiving web and app data. There's over 3,000 of them.

Looking at this graph from a few sites, that might not be too surprising.

Oracle Identity Graph

\footnotesize ``Aggregates and provides insights on over $2 trillion in consumer spending from 1,500 data partners across 110 million US households''\cite{oracle:datalogix-acq}

Look how happy she is to be tracked! I'm kidding of course. If we put some random person's picture in her place, they might feel a bit uncomfortable.

Alright, Oracle Identity Graph. <Read quote>

Look at that last bullet point there. ``Deliver a more relevant customer experience''.

All About the Experience   B_fullframe

\Huge ``More Relevant Customer Experience''

More relevant customer experience. You hear that a lot from advertisers, especially to justify.

Target Pregnancy Prediction

<1-> Records purchases, credit cards, coupons, surveys, refunds, customer helpline calls, email, website visits, \ldots\cite{networks-of-control} <1-> Purchase more information from third parties\cite{networks-of-control} <2-> Identified 25 products to create a ``pregnancy prediction'' score and estimate due date\cite{nyt:learn-secrets} <2-> Quantities of types of lotions, soaps, cotton balls, supplements, etc

One of the most popular examples of these types of analytics is a case where a father received coupons for baby clothes in the mail for his daughter. Target successfully predicted that she was pregnant based on certain items that she purchased, like quantities of certain lotions, and even things like cotton balls. They call this a ``pregnancy prediction''. It's creepy. It's lucrative.

Transparency Needed

Trustev Graph

∈cite{trustev:tech}

Summary

Let users see their data in this graph! Erase nonpublic information that they don't want to be known Let them correct what is wrong <3> Also a problem with law enforcement / government <2-> Let them opt out!

Look, at the end of the day, some people do legitimately want this. They want to have this ``relevant customer experience''.

What we need is transparency.

Companies like Oracle should let you see your data in this graph. Let you correct it if it's wrong. Erase it if it's nonpublic information that you don't want to be known. And allow you to opt out!

We talked about government surveillance a while ago. This is a problem there as well. What if you're flagged as suspicious? Put on some no-fly list or terrorism watch list? What if it were based on completely wrong information inferred by some algorithm?

Let's look at that graph on the left a little more closely.

These Data Affect Your Life!

Trustev Fraud Detection

∈cite{trustev:tech}

This is a graph of sources for TransUnion's fraud prevention system. There are a lot of data sources here. And look at the node at the bottom— ``machine learning''.

What if this were wrong? You'd be flagged as a fraud. This could be inconvenient— like not being able to make an online purchase. But what if you are denied a loan because of things like this? Or…denied employment?

LexisNexis

Risk management for insurance, finance, retail, travel, government, gaming, and healthcare\cite{networks-of-control} Data on over 500 million customers TrueID—34 billion records from over 10,000 sources\cite{lexisnexis:trueid}

``We help insurers assess their risk and streamline the underwriting process in 99% of all U.S. auto insurance claims and more than 90% of all homeowner claims.''

There's a ton of these companies; we only have time for a few. LexisNexis is another popular one. And it's fun to say.

They handle risk management for various industries. And they pull from a pool of data of over 500 million customers.

<read quote>

To give you an idea of their scale: they also have a system called TrueID, which does identity verification for fraud detection. They aggregate tens of billions of records from over ten thousand sources.

Palantir

Co-founded by Peter Thiel of PayPal CIA, DHS, NSA, FBI, the CDC, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, Special Operations Command, West Point, the Joint IED-defeat organization and Allies, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.\cite{techcrunch:palantir}

Another highly controversial one is Palantir. It was started by one of the co-founders of PayPal, Peter Thiel, for terrorism intelligence. It's now used for its powerful analytic capabilities by not only private corporations, but numerous government agencies, a few of them being the CIA, DHS, FBI, and the NSA itself.

Yeah. What if these data are wrong?

More Information

Networks of Control   B_fullframe

∈cite{networks-of-control,33c3:surveil}

Shock and Awe

If this topic interests you, you need to read the paper Networks of Control. One of the authors gave a talk at the recent Chaos Communication Congress, and I was in both shock and awe. I've only had the chance to skim the paper. Both are referenced here.

Policy and Government [0/6]

Introduction [0/1]   B_ignoreheading

Introduction   B_fullframe

<1-> Governments have a duty to protect their people <2-> Governments have a duty to protect citizens' rights

\vspace{2ex} \only<3>{ \begin{center} These duties are often at odds \end{center} }

Where to begin.

Governments have a duty to protect their people. But they also have a duty to know their bounds; to protect citizens' rights and privacy.

We know how that story goes.

Surveillance [0/7]

History of NSA Surveillance

<1-> EFF has been fighting NSA domestic spying since 2005\cite{eff:nsa:timeline,mtg:uproar} <1-> AT&T technician Mark Klein <1-> Dragnet surveillance; NSA-controlled ``SG3 Secure Room'' <2-> Hepting v. AT&T (2006) <2-> Government and AT&T retroactive immunity through FAA (2008) <2-> Jewel v. NSA (2008) <2-> Summary of Voluminous Evidence

When we think of the term ``surveillance'', the NSA usually comes to mind.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been fighting the NSA in court since 2006. In 2005, a former AT&T technician Mark Klein provided ``undisputed evidence'' about an NSA-controlled room at AT&T named ``SG-3'', through which all traffic passed.

The EFF filed Hepting v. AT&T in 2006. But in 2008, both the government and AT&T were awarded retroactive immunity through the FISA Amendments Act. The case was dismissed in 2009, along with dozens of other lawsuits.

In response, the EFF filed Jewel v. NSA. The case also benefitted from three additional whistleblowers.

PRISM

6 June 2013—Guardian leaks slideshow describing PRISM

All companies denied involvement

But it didn't end there! Well, obviously, we know that now.

One day later, the Guardian releases a leaked slideshow that describes PRISM.

All companies eventually denied involvement in this program.

Snowden

9 June 2013—The Guardian reveals Edward Snowden as the whistleblower

Smear campaign

These were serious leaks. They still are. And three days later—to our surprise—the source of the leaks was revealed.

And the world came to know Edward Snowden through a huge smear campaign. They pointed out that his girlfriend was a pole dancer. They tried to discredit his role at the agency. They tried to paint him as this social loner, and downplay his skills.

Fortunately, that conversation didn't last long, and did not succeed. I'm not sure how many of you were here last year, but Snowden gave the opening keynote to LP2016. He received a minute-long standing ovation. The energy in that room was incredible.

Tools

TODO

XKeyscore and others Exploits Hardware Intercepting shipments Etc.

Crypto Wars [0/6]

Introduction   B_fullframe

\Huge History repeats itself

All of that happened behind our backs.

But there is also a war being waged in public. As if we haven't learned from the past. The Crypto wars.

Export-Grade Crypto

<1-> Cryptography classified as munitions (Arms Export Control Act; ITAR) <1-> ``Export-grade'' cryptography <2-> Lotus Notes <2-> 40-bit export-grade symmetric key <3-> Agreement with NSA: 64-bit export, but 24 of those bits a "workload reduction factor" for the NSA <4-> Phil Zimmerman: PGP (≥ 128 bits) <4-> Formal investigation by US government in 1993 <4-> Published source code in a book, which could be OCR'd <5-> Still suffer long-term effects today (downgrade attacks, e.g. POODLE)\cite{poodle:paper}

Back in the 1990s, cryptography was classified as munitions.

If you wanted to export it to other countries, you essentially had to make it crackable by the NSA.

Lotus Notes is often used as an example of the negative effects of such regulation. Interestingly, it was actually the first widely used software to use public-key cryptography. Due to export restrictions, the maximum symmetric key size they could support was 40 bits. This was easily crackable by the NSA, but also feasible for other adversaries. They compromised with the NSA: 64-bit keys, but 24 of those bits would be encrypted specially for the NSA as a "workload reduction factor". So you had protection against most adversaries, but not the US government.

Then we have Phil Zimmerman, author of PGP. He didn't consult the NSA. Instead, he published the source code for PGP in a book with MIT Press, and widely distributed it. If someone wanted to use PGP, they could unbind the book, OCR the pages, and compile it with GCC. The US government opened a formal investigation into the case in 1993; the charges were dropped years later.

We are still observing the fallout from export-grade crypto today. They are called "downgrade attacks", where a program such as a browser is tricked into using a weaker cipher or keysize, allowing an attacker to MitM the connection. POODLE is an example of this.

Bernstein v. United States

<1-> 1995: Bernstein v. US Department of Justice\cite{eff:bernstein:doj} <1-> Argued that restrictions violated First Amendment <2-> Code Is Speech <1-> 1996: Bill Clinton Executive Order 13026 transferred to Commerce Control List\cite{fedr:export-controls} <1-> Department of Commerce relaxed rules in 2000\cite{doc:rev-export-reg}

In order to publish information on encryption algorithms and the like, you had to get permission from the government.

In 1995, Daniel Bernstein—then a graduate student—wanted to publish the source code and mathematical papers for his encryption algorithm Snuffle. Like Zimmerman, Bernstein thought export restrictions to be a violation of his First Amendment rights. But instead of blatant defiance, he decided to sue the US government. He was represented by the EFF. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in his favor.

The following year, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order that removed encryption from the munitions list, and in 2000 the Department of Commerce relaxed export restrictions.

You might have heard the term "code is speech". Bernstein v. United States case had wide-reaching consequences, not just for cryptography. Source code is protected under the First Amendment.

(See also Junger v. Daley.)

The First Crypto Wars

<1-> These incidents part of the first Crypto Wars\cite{w:crypto-wars} <2-> DES Originally 64-bit key; NSA wanted 48 bits; compromised at 56. <2-> Two version of the browser: 128-bit "U.S. edition" and effective 40-bit "international". <3-> Clipper Chip was a hardware backdoor that employed a key escrow system <3-> Complete failure <3-> Terribly insecure (property of key escrow in general) <3-> Opposite effect: spurred development of Nautilus and PGPfone

These incidents are classified into a period of time informally described as the "Crypo Wars".

There's a couple other good examples that I don't have time to get into: The DES encryption algorithm, for example, was originally 64-bit; the NSA wanted 48-bit, but compromised with 56. Netscape had two versions of their browser: one with 128-bit SSL and the other with 88 of those bits exposed to meet export regulations. This sounds insane today—because it is.

But there's even more insanity.

The Clipper Chip! It was the US government's attempt to backdoor communications with hardware. It used a key escrow system, and the algorithm they devised—called Skipjack—was classified, and so could not be reviewed by crypto experts at the time. Backlash was large. It failed miserably. Later cryptanalysis yielded scathing flaws, as is generally the case with key escrow cryptosystems. It even had the opposite effect: it spurred the development of encrypted communication programs like Nautilus and PGPfone (the latter being proprietary).

So, why did I go into so much history in a talk meant to deal with today's privacy and security threats?

Re-repeats Itself   B_fullframe

\Huge History repeats itself

Because history repeats itself.

Today's attempted legal/policy assault on privacy and security are enormous. We've already covered some. I don't have time to cover more than a small fraction of them.

Modern Crypto Wars   B_fullframe

\Huge ``Going Dark''

But the big phrase you hear today is "going dark". Government agencies are fearful of broadening use of encryption because they can't read many of those communications.

``Going Dark''

Apple v. FBI VEP

Espionage [0/1]

US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets

TODO

Office of Personnel Management DNC VEP

Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1]

National Security Letters

TODO

Gag orders Prior restraint Canaries

Law [0/1]

Summary   B_fullframe

TODO

DMCA Risks to security researchers Draconian CFAA

Your Fight [0/1]

Headings [0/6]

Feeding   B_fullframe

We're feeding into all of this!

SaaSS and Centralization

TODO

Be sure to mention Cloudbleed and S3 Who has access to your data? The "Cloud"

Corporate Negligence

Companies balance security and privacy on their balance sheets

Companies don't care. They'll balance costs of failure to comply with regulation. Is it cheaper just to pay up in the event of a data breach?

Governments try, sort of. They need to catch up with the times. <<sec regulations>>

<<large-scale breaches>>

(Tie into SaaSS)

Status Quo

Do people care more about privacy and security since the Snowden leaks? (Cite) ``I have nothing to hide'' ``Report anything suspicious'' Chilling effects

You would think after the Snowden revelations that people would be more privacy-centric.

Some are. Many aren't. There is complacency with the status quo. Everything is so convenient.

"I have nothing to hide." A common argument. One that can be notoriously hard to address.

"Report anything suspicious." (Example of mathematician on plane.)

These all have chilling effects, conscious or not. <<Wikipedia articles>>

Status Quo Cannot Hold   B_fullframe

The status quo cannot hold.

I hope I've convinced you that the status quo cannot hold. That even people who aren't that privacy- or security-conscious recognize that there are risks not only at a personal level, but also national and global.

Push Back   B_fullframe

Good crypto; no trust Lawmakers: this is not something we can win while we fight with our governments.

Thank You   B_fullframe

Mike Gerwitz

mtg@gnu.org">mtg@gnu.org

\bigskip

References Available Online

https://mikegerwitz.com/talks/sapsf

\vfill

Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 International License

References   B_appendix

\printbibliography

Exporting

You should be able to simply export this buffer as a Beamer presentation (C-c C-e l P) and get a slideshow.

Note that this requires ox-extras, which is part of Org Mode's contrib/. Without it, the :ignore: tag will not be recognized and the rendered slides will have incorrect depth.

Local Variables