55 lines
2.1 KiB
Plaintext
55 lines
2.1 KiB
Plaintext
|
Key Transition Statement
|
||
|
|
========================
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
New Fingerprint: D6E9 B930 028A 6C38 F43B 2388 FEF6 3574 5E6F 6D05
|
||
|
|
2016-10-13
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Old Fingerprint: 2217 5B02 E626 BC98 D7C0 C2E5 F22B B815 8EE3 0EAB
|
||
|
|
2011-06-16
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
I have transitioned away from my old GPG key 0x0EAB to 0x6D05; the new
|
||
|
|
key will be used exclusively from this point forward. Please
|
||
|
|
discontinue use of 0x0EAB.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The new key has been signed with the old to assert my identity and
|
||
|
|
introduce it into the web of trust. This message has been signed with
|
||
|
|
both keys; two detached signatures are available:
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
gpg --verify key-transition.txt.new.asc key-transition.txt
|
||
|
|
gpg --verify key-transition.txt.new.asc key-transition.txt
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The old 0x0EAB key will be allowed to expire on 2017-04-19, at which
|
||
|
|
time it will be revoked and marked as superseded. This expiry will
|
||
|
|
allow the new key to remain in the web of trust until I can have my
|
||
|
|
new key signed at the LibrePlanet 2017 conference in March. There is
|
||
|
|
little use in changing the expiration to an earlier date when many may
|
||
|
|
not update my public key until it has expired anyway.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Background
|
||
|
|
----------
|
||
|
|
My security practices have changed considerably since
|
||
|
|
the old 0x0EAB key was created back in 2011---I have no way to
|
||
|
|
guarantee that the secret key has not been compromised in some way in
|
||
|
|
past years, though I'm fairly confident that it hasn't. The secret
|
||
|
|
key is also stored on the same box as the subkeys.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The new secret key is stored offline on encrypted storage and will
|
||
|
|
only be accessed using an airgapped system running a trusted,
|
||
|
|
hardened, ephemeral operating system (e.g. Tails). The keys were
|
||
|
|
generated in that same environment.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The subkeys are placed on a tamper-proof smartcard (Nitrokey Pro, at
|
||
|
|
present). The card will be locked after three invalid PIN attempts,
|
||
|
|
and bricked after three invalid Admin PIN attempts. If the card is
|
||
|
|
ever misplaced or cardnapped, I will still revoke the subkeys for good
|
||
|
|
measure.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
--
|
||
|
|
Mike Gerwitz
|
||
|
|
Free Software Hacker+Activist | GNU Maintainer & Volunteer
|
||
|
|
GPG: 575B 4A21 12A4 BB38 4B7E 3681 2E8F D41C 5322 6D05
|
||
|
|
Old: 2217 5B02 E626 BC98 D7C0 C2E5 F22B B815 8EE3 0EAB
|
||
|
|
https://mikegerwitz.com
|