diff --git a/slides.org b/slides.org index 9f1fe9e..a66f7e1 100644 --- a/slides.org +++ b/slides.org @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #+BEGIN: columnview :hlines 3 :id global | ITEM | DURATION | TODO | ENVIRONMENT | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| +| * LaTeX Configuration | | | | +|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | * Slides | 0:44 | LACKING | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | ** Introduction / Opening | 00:00:30 | DRAFT | fullframe | @@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ | **** ALPRs | 00:01 | LACKING | | | **** Car Itself | 00:00:30 | LACKING | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| -| ** The Web [0/6] | 0:12 | LACKING | | +| ** The Web [0/6] | 0:10 | LACKING | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | *** Introduction [0/1] | | DRAFT | ignoreheading | | **** Introduction | | DRAFT | fullframe | @@ -81,18 +83,18 @@ | **** Trackers | 00:01 | LACKING | | | **** Like Buttons | 00:01 | DRAFT | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| -| *** Fingerprinting [0/3] | 0:04 | LACKING | | +| *** Fingerprinting [0/3] | 0:03 | LACKING | | | **** Summary | | DRAFT | | -| **** Alarmingly Effective | 00:03 | DEVOID | fullframe | -| **** Browser Addons | 00:01 | DEVOID | | +| **** Alarmingly Effective | 00:03 | LACKING | fullframe | +| **** User Agent | | DRAFT | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| -| *** Anonymity [0/4] | 0:04 | LACKING | | -| **** Summary | 00:01 | LACKING | fullframe | -| ***** TODO Anonymity | | | | -| ***** TODO Pseudonymity | | | | +| *** Anonymity [0/4] | 0:04 | DRAFT | | +| **** Summary | 00:01 | DRAFT | fullframe | +| ***** Anonymity | | | | +| ***** Pseudonymity | | | | | **** IANAAE | | DRAFT | fullframe | -| **** The Tor Network | 00:01 | DEVOID | | -| **** TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix | 00:02 | DEVOID | | +| **** The Tor Network | 00:01 | DRAFT | | +| **** TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix | 00:02 | DRAFT | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | ** Data Analytics [0/2] | 0:04 | LACKING | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| @@ -109,16 +111,23 @@ | *** Introduction [0/1] | 0:00 | DRAFT | ignoreheading | | **** Introduction | 00:00:30 | DRAFT | fullframe | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| -| *** Surveillance [0/4] | 0:06 | LACKING | | -| **** History of NSA Surveillance | 00:02 | DEVOID | | -| **** Verizon Metadata | 00:00:30 | DEVOID | | -| **** Snowden | 00:01 | DEVOID | | +| *** Surveillance [0/7] | 0:06 | LACKING | | +| **** History of NSA Surveillance | 00:02 | DRAFT | | +| **** Ron Wyden | | DRAFT | fullframe | +| **** The Leak | | DRAFT | fullframe | +| **** Verizon Metadata | 00:00:30 | DRAFT | | +| **** PRISM | | DRAFT | | +| **** Snowden | 00:01 | DRAFT | | | **** Tools | 00:02 | DEVOID | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| -| *** Crypto Wars [0/3] | 0:03 | LACKING | | +| *** Crypto Wars [0/6] | 0:04 | LACKING | | | **** Introduction | 00:00 | DRAFT | fullframe | -| **** Bernstein v. United States | 00:01 | DEVOID | | -| **** Makes Us Less Safe | 00:02 | DEVOID | | +| **** Export-Grade Crypto | 00:01:30 | DRAFT | | +| **** Bernstein v. United States | 00:01 | DRAFT | | +| **** The First Crypto Wars | 00:01 | DRAFT | | +| **** Re-repeats Itself | 00:00 | DRAFT | fullframe | +| **** Modern Crypto Wars | | DRAFT | fullframe | +| **** ``Going Dark'' | | DEVOID | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | *** Espionage [0/1] | 0:01 | LACKING | | | **** US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets | 00:01 | DEVOID | | @@ -141,6 +150,8 @@ |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | ** Thank You | | | fullframe | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| +| ** References | | | appendix | +|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | * Exporting | | | | |-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------| | * Local Variables | | | | @@ -1270,7 +1281,7 @@ TODO #+END_COMMENT -*** LACKING Crypto Wars [0/3] +*** LACKING Crypto Wars [0/6] **** DRAFT Introduction :B_fullframe: :PROPERTIES: :DURATION: 00:00 @@ -1278,7 +1289,7 @@ TODO :END: #+BEGIN_CENTER -History repeats itself +\Huge History repeats itself #+END_CENTER #+BEGIN_COMMENT @@ -1290,34 +1301,189 @@ The Crypto wars. #+END_COMMENT -**** DEVOID Bernstein v. United States +**** DRAFT Export-Grade Crypto +:PROPERTIES: +:DURATION: 00:01:30 +:END: + +- <1-> Cryptography classified as munitions (Arms Export Control Act; ITAR) +- <1-> ``Export-grade'' cryptography +- <2-> Lotus Notes + - <2-> 40-bit export-grade symmetric key + - <3-> Agreement with NSA: 64-bit export, but 24 of those bits a "workload + reduction factor" for the NSA +- <4-> Phil Zimmerman: PGP (\geq 128 bits) + - <4-> Formal investigation by US government in 1993 + - <4-> Published source code in a book, which could be OCR'd +- <5-> Still suffer long-term effects today + (downgrade attacks, e.g. POODLE)\cite{poodle:paper} + +#+BEGIN_COMMENT +Back in the 1990s, + cryptography was classified as munitions. + +If you wanted to export it to other countries, + you essentially had to make it crackable by the NSA. + +Lotus Notes is often used as an example of the negative effects of such + regulation. +Interestingly, it was actually the first widely used software to use + public-key cryptography. +Due to export restrictions, + the maximum symmetric key size they could support was 40 bits. +This was easily crackable by the NSA, + but also feasible for other adversaries. +They compromised with the NSA: + 64-bit keys, but 24 of those bits would be encrypted specially for the NSA + as a "workload reduction factor". +So you had protection against most adversaries, + but not the US government. + +Then we have Phil Zimmerman, author of PGP. +He didn't consult the NSA. +Instead, he published the source code for PGP in a book with MIT Press, + and widely distributed it. +If someone wanted to use PGP, + they could unbind the book, OCR the pages, and compile it with GCC. +The US government opened a formal investigation into the case in 1993; + the charges were dropped years later. + +We are still observing the fallout from export-grade crypto today. +They are called "downgrade attacks", + where a program such as a browser is tricked into using a weaker + cipher or keysize, + allowing an attacker to MitM the connection. +POODLE is an example of this. +#+END_COMMENT + + +**** DRAFT Bernstein v. United States +:PROPERTIES: +:DURATION: 00:01 +:END: +- <1-> 1995: Bernstein v. US Department of Justice\cite{eff:bernstein:doj} + - <1-> Argued that restrictions violated First Amendment + - <2-> **Code Is Speech** +- <1-> 1996: Bill Clinton Executive Order 13026 transferred to Commerce + Control List\cite{fedr:export-controls} +- <1-> Department of Commerce relaxed rules in 2000\cite{doc:rev-export-reg} + +#+BEGIN_COMMENT +In order to publish information on encryption algorithms and the like, + you had to get permission from the government. + +In 1995, Daniel Bernstein---then a graduate student---wanted to publish the + source code and mathematical papers for his encryption algorithm + /Snuffle/. +Like Zimmerman, + Bernstein thought export restrictions to be a violation of his First + Amendment rights. +But instead of blatant defiance, + he decided to sue the US government. +He was represented by the EFF. +The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in his favor. + +The following year, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order that + removed encryption from the munitions list, + and in 2000 the Department of Commerce relaxed export restrictions. + +You might have heard the term "code is speech". +Bernstein v. United States case had wide-reaching consequences, + not just for cryptography. +Source code is protected under the First Amendment. + +(See also Junger v. Daley.) +#+END_COMMENT + + +**** DRAFT The First Crypto Wars :PROPERTIES: :DURATION: 00:01 :END: -TODO +- <1-> These incidents part of the first Crypto Wars\cite{w:crypto-wars} +- <2-> DES Originally 64-bit key; NSA wanted 48 bits; compromised at 56. +- <2-> Two version of the browser: 128-bit "U.S. edition" and effective + 40-bit "international". +- <3-> **Clipper Chip** was a hardware backdoor that employed a key escrow + system + - <3-> Complete failure + - <3-> Terribly insecure (property of key escrow in general) + - <3-> Opposite effect: spurred development of Nautilus and PGPfone #+BEGIN_COMMENT -... -(Include export-grade crypto) -(Code is speech) +These incidents are classified into a period of time informally described as + the "Crypo Wars". + +There's a couple other good examples that I don't have time to get into: + The DES encryption algorithm, for example, was originally 64-bit; + the NSA wanted 48-bit, but compromised with 56. + Netscape had /two versions of their browser/: one with 128-bit SSL and the + other with 88 of those bits exposed to meet export regulations. +This sounds insane today---because it is. + +But there's even more insanity. + +The Clipper Chip! +It was the US government's attempt to backdoor communications with hardware. +It used a key escrow system, + and the algorithm they devised---called Skipjack---was classified, + and so could not be reviewed by crypto experts at the time. +Backlash was large. +It failed miserably. +Later cryptanalysis yielded scathing flaws, + as is generally the case with key escrow cryptosystems. +It even had the opposite effect: + it spurred the development of encrypted communication programs like + Nautilus and PGPfone (the latter being proprietary). + +So, + why did I go into so much history in a talk meant to deal with today's + privacy and security threats? #+END_COMMENT -**** DEVOID Makes Us Less Safe +**** DRAFT Re-repeats Itself :B_fullframe: :PROPERTIES: -:DURATION: 00:02 +:DURATION: 00:00 +:BEAMER_env: fullframe :END: -TODO +#+BEGIN_CENTER +\Huge History repeats itself +#+END_CENTER + +#+BEGIN_COMMENT +Because history repeats itself. + +Today's attempted legal/policy assault on privacy and security are enormous. +We've already covered some. +I don't have time to cover more than a small fraction of them. +#+END_COMMENT + + +**** DRAFT Modern Crypto Wars :B_fullframe: +:PROPERTIES: +:BEAMER_env: fullframe +:END: + +#+BEGIN_CENTER +\Huge ``Going Dark'' +#+END_CENTER + + +#+BEGIN_COMMENT +But the big phrase you hear today is "going dark". +Government agencies are fearful of broadening use of encryption + because they can't read many of those communications. +#+END_COMMENT + + +**** DEVOID ``Going Dark'' #+BEGIN_COMMENT Apple v. FBI - -- Backdoors -- Clipper chip -- LOGJAM, etc from export-grade crypto -- VEP +VEP #+END_COMMENT @@ -1332,6 +1498,7 @@ TODO #+BEGIN_COMMENT - Office of Personnel Management - DNC +- VEP #+END_COMMENT